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1. Introduction
The Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings for the United
States Supreme Court catapulted sexual harassment to the fore-
front of the American public consciousness and, to a lesser extent,
the world's consciousness.' For many in the international commu-
nity and within the United States, domestic sexual harassment law
and publicity accompanying displays, such as the Thomas hearings,
reflect radical American feminists' attempts to eradicate and re-
press the natural differences between men and women.2 As public
discomfort over the Thomas spectacle indicates, many would prefer
to leave issues of sexual behavior in a realm protected from judicial
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sity of Pennsylvania, J.D. Boston University.
** Associate Professor of Law, Bentley College, Waltham, Mass., B.A., M.A.
Boston College, J.D. Suffolk University, L.L.M. Boston University. The authors
wish to express their appreciation to Margo E. K. Reder, Esq., Research Associate,
Bentley College for her research and technical assistance on this project.
1. For discussion of the Judge Clarence Thomas hearings see DAVID BROCK,
THE REAL ANITA HILL (1993). This book is controversial because of its slant against
Professor Anita Hill and the author's view that liberals conspired to block the nomi-
nation of Thomas by any means. Mr. Brock argues that Professor Hill, who was
angry at Judge Thomas, was willing to be the vehicle for this derailment of the nomi-
nation. Id. at 335-81.
For a criticism of Mr. Brock's book see Jane Mayer & Jill Abramson, The Surreal
Anita Hill, NEW YORKER, May 24, 1993, at 90 (arguing that Brock's central thesis
that Anita Hill referred to another man harassing her, not Clarence Thomas, and
that she never cleared up this mistaken impression is wild speculation); Nellie Y.
McKay, Remembering Anita Hill and Clarence Thomas, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-
GENDERING POWER 269, 272 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992); Christine A. Littleton, Dispel-
ling Myths About Sexual Harassment and How the Senate Failed Twice, 65 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1419 (1992); see also Alan Riding, Harassment or Flirting? Europe tries to
decide, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 1992, at A8 (discussing how the Thomas hearings af-
fected Europe).
2. Sarah Catchpole, Paris Pooh Poohs L'Affaire Thomas, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
7, 1991, at 93 (discussing foreign reaction to the Thomas hearings); Richard Gwyn,
From Europe American Dream Looks Like a Nightmare, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 29,
1991, at A29 (referring to the U.S. as "bonkers" in an opinion column calling atten-
tion to political correctness and puritanism in Pennsylvania State University's deci-
sion to take down a Francisco Goya painting because it constituted sexual
harassment).
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inquiry.3 However, contrary to popular speculation, a review of
cases indicates that United States sexual harassment laws are
neither extreme nor out of line with the views of other developed
countries.
This article reviews international approaches to the issue of
sexual harassment in the workplace. These approaches suggest a
convergence of thought, acknowledging sexual harassment as
actionable and compensable discrimination. Unique differences in
domestic law, however, make sexual harassment more costly, as ex-
emplified by the rare million dollar verdict.4 While women are not
the only victims of sexual harassment,5 this article will focus on
sexual harassment directed against women in the workplace.
Sexual harassment in the workplace is a pervasive problem,
not only in the United States, but around the world. In the United
States, in the fourth quarter of 1992, 1,608 plaintiffs registered sex-
ual harassment complaints with the Equal Employment Opportuni-
ties Commission (EEOC).6 This compares with 1,244 complaints in
all of 1991, and 728 total complaints in 1990.7 Incidents of sexual
harassment vary by occupation. A 1980 survey of 23,000 federal
employees reported that 10% of employees had been pressured for
sex and 25% reported being touched or pinched.8 Sixty percent of
women lawyers in the Ninth Circuit report experiencing sexual har-
assment.9 One study estimated that sexual harassment costs a
large American company $6.7 million a year.lO
3. See Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law,
85 AM. J. IN'rL L. 613, 625-27 (1991) (discussing distinctions in international law
between public and private law and public sphere and domestic sphere).
4. Man Wins $1 Million Sex Harassment Suit, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1993, at
A15. In Minnesota, female employees of a mining company are bringing the first
sexual harassment class action suit. Harassment Class Suit Gets Nod, NAT'L L.J.,
May 31, 1993, at 10. The suit may cost the mining company millions of dollars. Id.
The suit, involving over 100 female miners who were subjected to nude photographs
and graffiti, was initiated eight years ago at the state level and filed in federal court
in 1988. Id. See also Sex-Harassment Ruling, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1993, at B8
(discussing the court's ruling in Jensen v. Eveleth Taconite Co., U.S. Dist. Ct., Minn.,
3rd Div., Civil No. 5-88-163).
5. See, e.g., Man Wins $1 Million Sex Harassment Suit, supra note 4 (describing
a sexual harassment suit won by a male employee against his female supervisor);
Sex Complaint, THE TIMES (LONDON), Jan. 17, 1992 (reporting that men in Swazi-
land complained to the union about women bosses harassing them).
6. Sexual Harassment, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 1993, at Al.
7. Id.
8. International Labour Office, Combating Sexual Harassment at Work, 11
CONDITIONS OF WORK DIGEST 160 (1992) [hereinafter DIGEST] (citing U.S. MERIT SYS-
TEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE - Is IT A
PROBLEM? (1981)).
9. See Mark Hansen, 9th Circuit Studies Gender Bias, 78 A.B.A. J. 30 (1992).
10. Susan Crawford, A Wink Here, a Leer There: It's Costly, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,
1993, at F17.
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Sexual harassment is not unique to the U.S. workplace. In
Japan, 6,500 individuals responded to a sexual harassment survey.
Of those responding, 70% said they had suffered sexual harassment
at work, and 90% were bothered by "staring and groping on public
transport.... ."11 An investigation at a Japanese employee's union
concluded that 500 out of 800 women suffered sexual harassment. 12
In Sweden, 17% of about 2,000 women surveyed said they tolerated
obscene language, sexual innuendoes, groping, lewd suggestions
and outright rape attempts in the workplace.i3 With respect to
Spain, one commentary reported that "with more than 8 out of 10
women regularly harassed at work, Spain is probably top of the Eu-
ropean league for obnoxious male chauvinism."14 In Germany,
more than two-thirds of German women report being sexually
harassed regularly, but nearly half of their male colleagues do not
think their behavior is offensive.15 In a poll of 9,000 women in
Frankfurt, Germany, 25% of the respondents reported sexual
harassment.16
Is sexual harassment simply a misunderstanding between the
sexes or something more serious?17 Some consider certain behavior
as "natural" to men - reflecting the old adage that "boys will be
boys."' 8 In fact, sexual harassment has nothing to do with sex, and
11. See Elisabeth Zingg, Complaint highlights sexual harassment in Japan,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 23, 1991 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File.
12. Elisabeth Zingg, Japan's female employees rebel against making tea, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 27, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File.
13. Lars Foyen, Slur to Egalitarian Image; Sweden Decries Sex Harassment on
Job, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 20, 1988 § 1, at 8.
14. See Tim McGirk, Tawdry Don Juan still stalks his prey in the cities of Spain,
INDEPENDENT, Feb. 20, 1990, at 12, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INDPNT
File.
15. Harassment A Problem, German Women Say, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1992, at
A21. In Germany a conviction for sexual harassment carries up to 10 years impris-
onment or a fine, but sexual harassment is rarely prosecuted. Id.
16. Frankfort Poll: On-the-Job Sexual Harassment Common, WEEK IN GERMANY,
Dec. 14, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WKGERM File.
17. A male managing law partner claimed misunderstanding in a case in which
a young woman secretary resigned from a law firm alleging that he sexually
harassed her. See John H. Kennedy, Trouble in the Firm, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 20,
1993 at 21. The plaintiff alleged that the partner fondled himself in her presence.
Id. An internal investigation concluded "the unintentional act of scratching himself
was not directed toward [the plaintiff] although, it could be embarrassing for any-
one." Id. When interviewed, another partner at the firm pondered, "Is [he] guilty of
making bad jokes? Yes. Is [he], as an almost 50-year-old man, not as attuned to
these things as a 20-year-old, maybe so .... Which is not to say anyone is lying, but I
think perceptions can be different, and people can have honest differences." Id. The
Massachusetts Commission against Discrimination is considering the case. Id.
18. But see KATE MxILLET, SExuAL PoLrTIcs 23 (1970), arguing that relationships
between men and women are governed by "sexual politics." Ms. Millet states
'politics' shall refer to power-structured relationships, arrangements
whereby one group of persons is controlled by another.., a relationship
1993]
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everything to do with power. In 1979, Professor Catharine MacKin-
non wrote that "[elconomic power is to sexual harassment as physi-
cal force is to rape."19 Other commentators dispute Professor
MacKinnon's view, believing that sexual conduct is essentially pri-
vate and the courts should not interfere.20 Until recently, domestic
violence and rape within marriage were legally tolerated and rarely
prosecuted.2 1 In this context of noninterference it is not surprising
that less than twenty years ago no court either in the United States
or abroad considered sexual harassment actionable, let alone a form
of discrimination. 22 Viewing sexual harassment as a form of dis-
crimination was a radical concept.
Recognition of sexual harassment as a form of actionable dis-
crimination in the U.S. and many other countries reflects pro-
gress. 23 However, the parameters of what constitutes actionable
sexual harassment still need definition in the United States. The
United Nations and other international groups have experienced
similar difficultly in defining human rights to encompass the rights
of dominance and subordinance. What goes largely unexamined, often
even unacknowledged (yet is institutionalized none-the-less) in our so-
cial order, is the birthright priority whereby males rule females ....
However muted its present appearance may be, sexual dominion ob-
tains never-the-less as perhaps the most pervasive idealogy of our cul-
ture and provides its most fundamental concept of power.
Id. at 23-25.
19. CATHARnE A. MAcKImNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WoMEN 217
(1979). Professor MacKinnon states that "sexual harassment, so conceptualized,
would be an abuse of hierarchical economic (or institutional) authority, not sexual-
ity.- Id. at 218.
20. See generally BROCK, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
21. See generally Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813 (1991) [here-
inafter Estrich, Sex at Work] (discussing perception of "real rape" - rape committed
by two strangers with a weapon who jumped from the bushes - as compared with
acquaintance rape); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986); SUSAN ESTRICH,
REAL RAPE (1987).
22. See Anita Diamant, Sexual harassment on job widespread, 24.nation study
says, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1, 1992, at 1.
Canadian Justice Bertha Wilson commented on the use of law to advance wo-
men's rights, noting that men have struggled "to assert their dignity and common
humanity against an overbearing state apparatus." Morgenthaler v. The Queen,
(1988) 1 S.C.R. 30 172 (Wilson J., concurring), quoted in Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Reflections on Sex Equality under the Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1327 (1991). Justice
Wilson contrasts women's rights as a
struggle to eliminate discrimination to achieve a place for women in a
man's world, to develop a set of legislative reforms in order to place
women in the same position as men... not to define the rights of wo-
men in relation to their special place in the societal structure and in...
distinction between the two sexes.
Id. at 1327-28.
23. For a discussion of the pervasive problem of sexual harassment, see Dia-
mant, supra note 22.
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of women.24 Consequently, sexual harassment and other serious
actions against women, including disfigurement, rape, torture and
execution, are carried out with impunity within many countries.25
The "radical" notion that women should be free from discrimination
arguably interferes with national sovereignty, culture and religious
autonomy.26 Some countries use the doctrines of privacy, sover-
eignty and religious freedom as a shield to prohibit inquiry and
remedies, and to perpetuate patriarchy.27
This article examines the international convergence of sexual
harassment law in the United States, the European Community
(EC) and several other countries. It recommends changes to U.S.
law, and adoption of a European Community directive. The United
States has led the development of sexual harassment law, resulting
in the removal of many barriers for women in the workplace.28
However, until women around the world have full civil rights, they
will not enjoy true equal employment opportunity, and the "glass
ceiling" will remain.29
H. United States Sexual Harassment Law: A Review
Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed sex
discrimination, 30 the full ramifications of this prohibition continue
to evolve. Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employ-
ment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate or classify his employ-
ees or applicants for employment in any way which would de-
prive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
24. For a discussion of the problems confronting the United Nations and various
countries in addressing women's rights see Charlesworth et al., supra note 3.
25. See generally AMNEsTY INT'L, WOMEN N THE FRONT LINE: HUMAN RiGHTrs
VIOLATONS AGAINST WOMEN (1991) (discussing human rights violations against wo-
men around the world); Note, What's Culture Got to Do With It? Excising the Harm-
ful Tradition of Female Circumcision, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1944 (1993) (documenting
female circumcision in Africa); Sharon K Horn, Female Infanticide in China: The
Human Rights Specter and Thoughts Towards (an) Other Vision, 23 COLuM. HUM.
RTs. L. Rav. 249 (1992).
26. See Charlesworth et al., supra note 3, at 634.
27. Id.
28. See, Diamant, supra note 22; see also discussion infra part II.
29. The Glass Ceiling Act of 1991 established the Glass Ceiling Commission to
investigate and recommend changes to reduce barriers to women in the workforce.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 203(a), 105 Stat. 1081 (1991).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). See also Pregnancy Discrimination Act of




opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.3 1
In interpreting this mandate against sex discrimination, the
challenge is largely to define what constitutes sex discrimination.
The absence of legislative history to Title VII complicates the
search for an adequate definition.32 The reason for the absence of
legislative history provides a telling insight into the attitudes of
many Americans toward gender discrimination. The framers of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not intend to outlaw sex discrimination
until the last moment.3 3 Sex was eventually included as a pro-
tected category by way of a last minute amendment proposed by
Representative Smith who opposed passage of the entire legisla-
tion.3 4 Smith intended to demonstrate how ludicrous the entire
anti-discrimination law was by including, to his mind, a ridiculous
prohibition against sex discrimination.35 However, Representative
Smith's colleagues passed the Civil Rights Act even with his "ab-
surd" amendment.3 6
Representative Smith's blunder presaged the second difficulty
with establishing a satisfactory definition of sex discrimination in
the workplace. The difficulty is that Title VII prohibited conduct
that many consider normal behavior. The struggle to find a satis-
factory definition for sexual harassment, and to decide whether sex-
ual harassment is a form of sex discrimination, paralleled a gradual
cultural consciousness-raising about sex discrimination in the
American workplace. 3 7
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
32. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986) (describ-
ing the addition of sex discrimination as an amendment to Title VII which Congress
adopted rapidly with little legislative history).
33. See, Jo Freeman, How 'Sex" Got Into Title VI: Persistent Opportunism as a
Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAw & INEQUALITY 1, 1 n.2 (1990) (citing 110 Cong. Rec.
2577 (1964)).
34. 110 CONG. REC. 2577, 2584 (1964).
35. See, Freeman, supra note 33, at 1.
36. 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964); see also, MacKinnon, supra note 22, at 1283-
84 nn. 15-17 (sex discrimination in employment forbidden only because of a last min-
ute joking "us boys" attempt to defeat Title VII's prohibition on racial
discrimination).
37. See generally MacKinnon, supra note 22, at 1298 (citing "unequal pay with
allocation to disrespected work" and "systematic sexual harassment" as among the
many bases for the unequal status of women in society).
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A Development of Sexual Harassment Law in the United
States
Quid Pro Quo Claims
As with most consciousness-raising, progress occurred incre-
mentally. Not until 1976 did any district court recognize sexual
harassment as actionable sex discrimination under Title VII.38
Predictably, early cases establishing a cause of action for sexual
harassment under Title VII involved egregious violations, not the
subtle, pervasive discrimination experienced by many women.39
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the agency cre-
ated by Congress to oversee enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, terms these blatant forms of discrimination "quid pro quo"
harassment.40 In quid pro quo cases, an employer conditions tangi-
ble job-related consequences on obtaining sexual favors from the
employee. To prevail on a quid pro quo cause of action, a plaintiff
must prove 1) that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual ad-
vances or requests for sexual favors; 2) that this harassment was
based on sex; and 3) that her reaction to the harassment affected
tangible aspects of the employee's compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment.41
Hostile Environment Claims
Sex discrimination in employment was outlawed in 1964 and
only expanded by the judiciary to include quid pro quo sexual har-
assment in 1976.42 The EEOC did not amend its guidelines to in-
clude a working definition of sexual harassment until 1980.43 The
EEOC amendment adopted not only a definition of quid pro quo
harassment, it also recognized a second kind of illegal sexual har-
38. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976) (recognizing sexual har-
assment as sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII).
39. For example, the federal courts have held that a plaintiff stated a cause of
action if she alleged that she was disciplined or discharged for refusing the sexual
advances of her supervisor. Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 568 F.2d
1044 (3rd Cir. 1977); Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459, 465-66
(E.D. Mich. 1977); Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 657-51; see also Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that a superior who dismissed an employee be-
cause she repulsed his sexual advances violated the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972).
40. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1992).
41. See, e.g., Spencer v. General Electric Co., 894 F.2d 651, 658 (4th Cir. 1990).
42. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; see also Williams, 413 F. Supp. at
657-61 (holding that plaintiff, who alleged that she had been fired for declining her
supervisor's sexual advances, had stated a cause of action under Title VII).
43. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1992); See also Bonnie B. Westman, Note, The Rea-
sonable Woman Standard: Preventing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 18 WM.
MrrCHELL L. REv. 795, 798-99 (1992).
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assment, termed "hostile environment" harassment.44 The EEOC
specified that "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual fa-
vors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature consti-
tute sexual harassment when ... such conduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work per-
formance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment." 45
In acknowledging hostile environment sexual harassment, the
EEOC recognized the subtle, and perhaps more destructive, biases
impeding opportunities for women in the workplace. Issues of sex
discrimination no longer focused on whether the discrimination was
sufficiently serious to constitute a civil rights violation. Rather, the
inquiry considered whether an employer's or co-worker's behavior
interfered with another worker's right to a workplace free of har-
assment and thus became illegal. This development signaled the
EEOC's recognition that an individual can be harmed by discrimi-
nation even if that discrimination does not result in economic depri-
vation.46 Drawing on background court cases and EEOC precedent
relating to Title VII, the EEOC served notice on the American pub-
lic that a woman has a civil right to work in an environment where
she will not suffer psychological harm because her employer allows
an atmosphere which demeans or intimidates her because of her
sex.
4 7
Recognition of hostile environment claims seemed a battle
won. However, the significance of this victory was limited by a time
lag between the EEOC's formalization of the hostile environment
cause of action and judicial recognition of the claim.4S Ironically,
although the EEOC took the lead in defining the hostile environ-
ment claim, the EEOC itself failed to recognize a blatant example of
a hostile environment.49 In 1986, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vin-
son, the Supreme Court first recognized a hostile environment
44. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
45. Id.; cf. ALBA CONTE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT N THE WoRKPLACE: LAW AND PRAc-
TicE 3-4 (1991) (Some feminist theorists assert that a better definition centers on the
concept of power).
46. EEOC: Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Man.
(BNA) 405:6681, 6682 (1990) [hereinafter Policy Guidance].
47. Id. at 6691-92; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3); see also Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65.
48. The EEOC formalized the hostile environment claim in 1980, and the United
States Supreme Court first recognized hostile environment sexual harassment as
actionable sex discrimination in 1986. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65.
49. Estrich, Sex at Work, supra note 21, at 821 n.24 (noting that the EEOC failed
to recognize the sexual harassment perpetrated against Mechelle Vinson and argued
that there was no actionable claim in Vinson).
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claim under Section 703 of Title VII.50 The EEOC, in its amicus
brief, argued that Vinson did not have an actionable claim because
"sexual attraction is a fact of life" often playing a role in interac-
tions between employees in the workplace.S1 The EEOC's contra-
dictory position underscores the discrepency between theoretical
recognition of misconduct, and recognition of actual misconduct en-
demic to the mores of a culture.
The facts and judicial history of Vinson neatly outline the
problems inherent in pursuing a sexual harassment case under a
hostile environment claim. Meritor's vice-president, Sidney Taylor,
hired Mechelle Vinson and became her supervisor.52 Taylor pro-
ceeded to request that Vinson sleep with him.53 Initially, Vinson
refused, but fearing she would lose her job, she eventually com-
plied.54 Taylor proceeded to demand sex repeatedly, and asserted
his "sexual possession" of Vinson through lewd public behavior at
work.55 Vinson testified that Taylor forceably raped her several
times.56 Eventually, Vinson notified Taylor that she intended to
take indefinite sick leave, and the bank fired her.5 7 Vinson sued
claiming constant sexual harassment.5 8
The district court rejected Vinson's claim, citing evidence that
her promotions from teller to assistant branch manager were based
on merit, rather than her sexual capitulation to Taylor.5 9 Despite
the EEOC guidelines promulgated in 1980, the district court failed
to recognize the hostile work environment Taylor created.60 In-
stead, the court required a quid pro quo cause of action but failed to
find that tangible aspects of Vinson's employment were conditioned
on acquiescing to Taylor's harassment.61 The district court further
refused to recognize the coercion inherent in the harassment situa-
tion because of the inequity of power between the parties, and con-
50. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 73, affg and remanding Vinson
v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The district court opinion may be found at
22 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 30,708, at 14,691, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37
(D.D.C. 1980).
51. Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion at 13, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979); see
also Estrich, Sex at Work, supra note 21, at 821 n.24.
52. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 59.




57. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 60.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 59, 61.
60. Id. at 61.
61. Id. at 61-62 (quoting the district court's statement that any sexual interac-
tion between Taylor and Vinson had nothing to do with her continued employment).
1993]
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cluded that Vinson's relationship with Taylor was voluntary. 62
Finally, the district court held that the bank was not liable even if
Taylor was guilty of misconduct.63 This finding conflicted with
other Title VII precedents which held employers strictly liable for
actions of their supervisors. 64
In essence, the district court's ruling harkens back to the
traditional status quo regarding sexual relationships in the work-
place. The court focused on the woman's conduct, her acquiescence,
her dress, and her past life, rather than on the man's behavior.65
The court disregarded the power differential between the parties,
and seemed to use the woman's competence against her.66 Indeed,
the district court's reasoning provides a clear example of the cul-
tural assumptions which impede effective use of Title VII to obtain
redress for sexual harassment.
In reversing the district court, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit emphasized the legitimacy of hostile
environment causes of action.67 The appellate court found that
Taylor had indeed created a hostile work environment for Vinson,
and that, as with all other Title VII cases, the bank was liable for
the actions of its supervisor, actual knowledge of Taylor's misbe-
havior notwithstanding.68 The court decided that a supervisor
need not inflict economic damage to be guilty of sexual
harassment.6 9
In 1986, twenty-two years after Title VII recognized sex dis-
crimination,70 the Supreme Court recognized hostile environment
claims as bona fide causes of action under Title VII.71 The Supreme
Court stated that the gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is
that the alleged sexual advances were "unwelcome."72 This "un-
62. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 61.
63. Id. at 62, 69.
64. Id. at 70-71 (citing Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hospital, Inc., 464
F.2d 723, 725 (6th Cir. 1972)). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1993) (EEOC guide-
line stating that employers should be strictly liable for acts of sexual harassment by
their agents or supervisory employees).
65. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 n.36 (1985), affd sub nom. Meritor Sav-
ings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
66. See Estrich, Sex at Work, supra note 21, at 824 (discussing the bind Vinson
was in - her failure to testify in court that she "slept [her] way to the top" resulted
in the district court finding her promotions were based on merit).
67. Vinson, 753 F.2d at 145.
68. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 62-63.
69. Id. at 64-65.
70. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
71. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 63.
72. Id. at 68. The Court also affirmed that economic harm is not necessary for a
Title VII cause of action, and thus ended de facto acceptance of this kind of sexual
harassment. Id. at 71.
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welcomeness" standard reflects the Supreme Court's recognition
that the district court failed to understand the politics of power
when it found that Mechelle Vinson voluntarily entered into a rela-
tionship with her boss. In fact, the Supreme Court stated that "vol-
untary" submission to sexual acts will not necessarily invalidate a
subsequent sexual harassment claim.73 The Court's statement sup-
ported the EEOC Guidelines which state that sexual harassment is
"[u]nwelcome ... verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature."74
The unwelcomeness test established by the Court, however, is not
always easy to satisfy.
According to the Vinson Court, the determinant of unwelcome-
ness should be whether the victim "by her conduct indicated that
the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome."75 Unfortunately,
this standard encouraged lower courts to focus on the victim's con-
duct, perhaps more intently than on the conduct of the accused.76
As often happens in rape cases, a victim's manner of dress and
speech became vindicators of an alleged harasser.77 To resolve this
problem, the EEOC Guideline recommends that courts evaluate
"the record as a whole and the totality of the circumstances,"78 giv-
ing more credence to cases where the victim has made a contempo-
raneous complaint. 79 Clearly, this EEOC Guideline, vague at best,
did not simplify resolution of sexual harassment claims.
The Vinson decision significantly advanced Title VII's man-
date to abolish sexual harassment by validating hostile environ-
ment claims, and by changing the criterion for judging a plaintiffs
response to harassment from "voluntariness" to "unwelcome-
ness."80 However, Vinson also presaged the difficulties which
plaintiffs pressing hostile environment suits would encounter. Cul-
tural biases die hard, and the same issues which befuddled the dis-
trict court in Vinson became issues in later court cases which
73. Id. at 68.
74. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1992);
see also Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, The Legal, Ethical, and Social Implica-
tions of the "Reasonable Woman" Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 61 FoRD-
HAm L. REV. 773, 785 (1993) (Vinson made clear that unwelcomeness is at the center
of Title VII sexual harassment claims).
75. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 68 (stating that the gravamen of sexual harassment
claims is unwelcomeness).
76. For example, the Supreme Court indicated that "provocative speech or dress"
are not irrelevant factors in assessing a hostile environment claim. Id. at 69.
77. See Estrich, Sex at Work, supra note 21, at 826-29 (discussing focus centered
on victim rather than on the perpetrator's conduct); see also Adler & Peirce, supra
note 74, at 786-87 & n.n.74-81.
78. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b).
79. Adler & Peirce, supra note 74, at 786 & n.73.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 70-73.
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wrestled with the question of when sexual harassment in the work-
place is sufficiently hostile to constitute a Title VII violation.8 1
B. EEOC Position: Reasonable Person Modified
Two primary issues dictate whether a work environment is
sufficiently hostile to violate Title VII. The first issue concerns the
appropriate standard for determining when a work environment is
sufficiently hostile to constitute sex discrimination. The second
consideration focuses on how harmful the environment must be in
order for an employee to have an actionable Title VII claim. The
EEOC's position is important to the question of an appropriate
standard. In its guidelines, the EEOC suggests a three-part test to
establish an actionable sexual harassment claim.82 The first two
elements refer to the more established quid pro quo harassment
claims, and thus provoke less discussion about the appropriate
judgment standard and necessary degree of harm:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute
sexual harassment when 1) submission to such conduct is made
either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individ-
ual's employment, [or] 2) submission to or rejection of such con-
duct by an individual is used as the basis for employment
decisions affecting such individual.8 3
The third part of the EEOC test describes the necessary condi-
tions for an actionable hostile environment claim.84 To establish a
hostile environment claim, the EEOC provides that sexual harass-
ment becomes actionable when "such conduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work per-
formance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work en-
vironment."85 This third prong of the EEOC test has proven
problematic for courts evaluating sexual harassment claims.86 The
language of this third prong reveals the basis for subsequent judi-
cial discussions of appropriate standard and degree of harm, be-
81. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) (holding that co-employee's obscenity and sexually-ori-
ented posters failed to sufficiently interfere with plaintiff's work environment or
cause psychological harm).
82. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
83. Id.
84. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(aX3).
85. Id.
86. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1198-99 (1989) ("Recent cases reflect judi-
cial confusion about the meaning of hostile environment sexual harassment, uncer-
tainty about how to evaluate it, and discomfort about the transformative potential of
the new claim.").
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cause what constitutes "unreasonable interference" to one person
may be merely an annoyance to another.8 7 Inherently, then, this
condition requires a subjective judgment which must be made as
objectively as possible by the courts.
In an attempt to create an objective standard as to when inter-
ference is unreasonable, the EEOC recommends evaluating the cir-
cumstances of each claim from the viewpoint of a reasonable
person.88 The reasonable person standard is meant to protect em-
ployers from frivolous actions.8 9 Thus, the EEOC suggests, by way
of example, that a reasonable person would not be seriously of-
fended by "invitations to join a group of employees who regularly
socialized at dinner after work."90 In fact, the EEOC implies that,
without more, the employee who considered such invitations to be
illegal "advances" would be considered unreasonable. 91
Even the judgment of who constitutes a reasonable person is
subjective, especially when evaluating the conduct of a sex tradi-
tionally accustomed to dominance. Thus, the EEOC elaborated the
"reasonable person" standard.92 According to the EEOC, the per-
spective should be that of the victim in her particular context, not
that of a stereotypical female.93 Here, the EEOC attempted to
adapt the "reasonable person" standard to account for inherent bias
against women. The EEOC's attempt to define an "androgynous"
reasonable person apparently resulted both from a perceived mis-
use of the reasonable person standard and a resistance to the sub-
sequent evolution of the reasonable woman standard. The EEOC
sought to shield decisions from cultural bias without adopting dif-
ferent standards for men and women.
87. The EEOC Policy Guidance provides an example, for it states, "sexual flirta-
tion or innuendo, even vulgar language that is trivial or merely annoying, would
probably not establish a hostile environment." Policy Guidance, supra note 46, at
6689. Surely, for some employees, working in an atmosphere where her coworkers
engage in constant sexual innuendos and vulgar language would interfere with their
ability to perform their work.
88. Id. at 6689 (stating that the harasser's conduct should be evaluated from the
objective standpoint of a reasonable person). The EEOC cautioned, however, that
the objective standard should not be applied in a vacuum, and courts should consider
the context and the victim's perspective. Id. at 6689-90. See generally Adler &
Peirce, supra note 74, at 773-74 & n.2 (discussing the confusion surrounding the
standard of review for such cases). Some courts have adopted a "reasonable woman"
standard, while others favor a "reasonable person" standard. Id.
89. Policy Guidance, supra note 46, at 6689 ('Title VII does not serve 'as a vehi-
cle for vindicating the petty slights suffered by the hypersensitive.'" (citation omit-




93. Id. at 6689-90 & n.20. See generally Adler & Peirce, supra note 74, at 798-
802 (discussing application of the reasonable person standard).
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In Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit applied the reasonable person standard improp-
erly.94 The plaintiff, Rabidue, was fired ostensibly for job-related
reasons.95 She sued, alleging hostile-environment sexual harass-
ment.9 6 Rabidue's boss "routinely referred to women as 'whores,'
'cunt,' 'pussy,' and 'tits," and sometimes directed these epithets at
Rabidue.9 7 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit focused on
Rabidue's personality, characterizing her as "intractable and opin-
ionated," while minimizing the offensiveness of her boss' behav-
ior.9 8 The court's apparently sex-biased assessment of the parties
resulted in a sexist application of the reasonable person standard.
The court decided that the obscenities routinely employed by
Rabidue's supervisor "although annoying, were not so startling as
to have affected seriously the psyches of the plaintiff or other fe-
male employees." 99 The court elaborated that because such behav-
ior was routine in American culture, it would not offend a
reasonable person.10 0 The reasoning of the majority in Rabidue il-
lustrates an inherent problem with the reasonable person standard.
The Rabidue court's sexist application of the reasonable person
94. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). See gener-
ally Adler & Peirce, supra note 74, at 791 (characterizing Rabidue as a "much criti-
cized" opinion).
95. 805 F.2d at 615.
96. Id. at 614. Under the hostile environment theory of sexual harassment law,
the court rejected the plaintiffs claims, notwithstanding the Vinson Court's state-
ment that the gravamen of such complaints is unwelcomeness. Vinson, 477 U.S. at
68. The Rabidue court clearly failed to appropriately define unwelcomeness even as
it acknowledged that the plaintiff was "annoyed" at the defendant, an "extremely
vulgar and crude individual who customarily made obscene comments about women
.... I Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 615. Accord Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 798 F.2d 210,
213-14 (7th Cir. 1986).
97. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 624 (Keith, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 615. Ms. Rabidue's co-workers called her "irascible" and "rude." Id.
The court concluded that while Ms. Rabidue was a capable employee, she was
"troublesome." Id.
99. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 622. The court added that the "vulgar language, cou-
pled with the sexually oriented posters, did not result in a working environment that
could be considered intimidating, hostile, or offensive .... ' Id.
100. Id. at 620-21. But see id. at 623-28 (Keith, J., dissenting). Judge Keith
wrote:
I hardly believe reasonable women condone the pervasive degradation
and exploitation of female sexuality perpetuated in American society.
In fact, pervasive societal approval thereof and of other stereotypes
stifles female potential and instills the debased sense of self worth
which accompanies stigmatization. The presence of pin-ups and misog-
ynous language in the workplace can only evoke and confirm the
debilitating norm by which women are primarily and contemptuously
valued as objects ....
Id. at 627.
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standard perpetuates the very culturally accepted behavior which
Title VII was meant to root out.
Reasonable Woman Standard
Judge Keith dissented from the Rabidue majority with respect
to the sexual harassment claim, advocating a "reasonable woman"
standard as an alternative to the reasonable person standard.' 0 '
Judge Keith declined to modify the "reasonable person" standard by
incorporating the victim's perspective, the position ultimately
adopted by the EEOC.102 Instead, Judge Keith argued that the
view of a reasonable man might indeed differ from the view of the
reasonable woman due to "sociological differences."103 Thus, he ar-
gued, when a woman is subjected to sexual harassment, the appro-
priate standard for judging the egregiousness of the offense is that
of a reasonable woman. 104 Judge Keith's dissent highlights the fact
that the experiences of men and women in American culture are
very different.105 Men are often brought up to believe that behavior
now defined as sexual harassment is their birthright.10 6 Women
have long been conditioned to accept this abuse as inevitable, in
spite of its effects upon them.10 7 Given this present sociological re-
ality, it appears that the judgment of the reasonable man might be
different from that of a reasonable woman. Thus, synthesizing the
two perspectives into a single objective standard might be
impossible.
Following Judge Keith's dissent, several courts adopted a "rea-
sonable woman" standard for hostile environment cases with a fe-
male plaintiff. 108 In Ellison v. Brady, the Court of Appeals for the
101. Id. at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting). Judge Keith concurred with the majority as
to the issue of successor liability. Id. at 623.
102. Id. at 626-27 (Keith, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 626.
104. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626. Judge Keith warned that "unless the outlook of
the reasonable woman is adopted, the defendants as well as the courts are permitted
to sustain ingrained notions of reasonable behavior fashioned by the offenders ....
Id. See also Vermett v. Hough, 627 F. Supp. 587, 605 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (apparently
the first federal court to adopt the reasonable woman standard); Nadine Taub, Keep-
ing Women in their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employment Discrimina-
tion, 21 B.C. L. REv. 345 (1980).
105. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626.
106. See generally Abrams, supra note 86 (exploring the idea that men view
harassing behavior differently than women).
107. Id. at 1202-09.
108. E.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3rd Cir. 1990)
(applying a reasonable woman standard, the court required that the discrimination
detrimentally affect "a reasonable person of the same sex in that position.. .. ");
Carrillo v. Ward, 770 F. Supp. 815,822 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (applying, without comment,
a reasonable woman standard); Vermett, 627 F. Supp. at 605 (adopting a standard
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Ninth Circuit emphatically adopted the reasonable woman stan-
dard.109 The Ellison court emphasized that the victim's perspec-
tive must be considered in such cases because men perceive sexual
conduct in the workplace differently than women.1 10 Thus, the El-
lison court adopted "the perspective of a reasonable woman primar-
ily because we believe that a sex-blind reasonable person standard
tends to be male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the ex-
periences of women."111
In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards,112 the court also em-
phasized sex-based differences in perception of sexual conduct in
the workplace. In Robinson, an expert for the plaintiff, Dr. Susan
Fiske, a Professor of Psychology, explained how the atmosphere at
Jacksonville Shipyards contributed to stereotyping female employ-
ees as sex objects.113 Dr. Fiske pointed to research that reveals
dramatic differences between men and women relative to sexual at-
tention in the workplace. 114 When asked how they would respond
to sexual comments and behavior at work, "two-thirds of the men
responded that they would be flattered; only fifteen percent would
feel insulted. For the women, the proportions are reversed."115
These results suggest that adoption of the reasonable woman stan-
dard might indeed be an appropriate way to insure equitable dispo-
sition of hostile environment cases.
The Rabidue decision was called into question by subsequent
Sixth Circuit decisions applying the "reasonable woman" stan-
dard.116 The Sixth Circuit court deciding Yates v. Avco Corp. con-
cluded that in hostile environment cases, "it seems only reasonable
that the person standing in the shoes of the employee should be the
reasonable woman." 117
under which "the average female employee would find that her overall work per-
formance is substantially and adversely affected by the conduct.").
109. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-81 (9th Cir. 1991).
110. Id. at 878-79. "A complete understanding of the victim's view requires,
among other things, an analysis of the different perspectives of men and women."
Id. at 878. Accord Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988)
(observing that a male employee may believe female co-workers are flattered when
they hear comments about their figures, but the women may find this offensive).
111. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
112. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
113. Id. at 1502-05.
114. Id. at 1505.
115. Id. The court characterized Dr. Fiske's testimony as "sound" and "credible,"
providing "an evidentiary basis for concluding that a sexualized working environ-
ment is abusive to a woman because of her sex." Id.
116. See, Yates v. Aveo Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 19'7); Kauffman v. Al-
lied Signal Corp., 970 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 831 (1992).
117. 819 F.2d at 637. The Yates court barely mentions Rabidue which it decided
only one year earlier. Id. The court cited, with approval Judge Keith's dissent in
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Reasonable Woman Revisited
One problem with the reasonable woman standard is that em-
ployers may be vulnerable to claims filed by hypersensitive sexual
harassment plaintiffs. While the word "reasonable" appears to pro-
vide this protection, nevertheless, the EEOC advocates combining
an objective standard (the reasonable person) with a subjective
standard (emphasizing the victim's perspective).1"s Following this
approach, the Third Circuit in Andrews v. City of Philadelphia
called its standard a reasonable woman standard, and emphasized
the need for subjectivity to protect the plaintiff and a concomitant
objectivity to protect the employer.119 The Seventh Circuit also
combined an objective and subjective approach.120 Like the EEOC,
however, the Seventh Circuit termed its objective standard a "rea-
sonable person" standard.121
The resistance of the EEOC and the Seventh Circuit to the
term "reasonable woman" should be examined. There are several
potential problems with the approach of the Seventh Circuit and
the EEOC. Men and women are socialized differently, and conse-
quently perceive sex in the workplace differently.122 Other areas of
the law involving women's issues, such as rape and pregnancy, take
account of this fact.123 Professor MacKinnon asserts that an ap-
Rabidue. Id. at n.2. But cf Highlander v. K.F.C. Natl Mgmt. Co., 805 F.2d 644,
649-50 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Rabidue with approval).
118. Policy Guidance, supra note 46, at 6689-90.
119. Andrews, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3rd Cir. 1990). The Robinson court articu-
lated this same need. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1523-
25 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
120. Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 913 F.2d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 1990) (stat-
ing that a trial court should employ both an objective and subjective analysis); King
v. Board of Regents, 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990) (looking at harassment "from
both the objective and subjective viewpoint of the plaintiff- in order to find discrimi-
nation, the court must conclude that 'the conduct would adversely affect both a rea-
sonable person and the particular plaintiff... .'"); Brooms v. Regal Tube, 881 F.2d
412, 418-19 (7th Cir. 1989) (asserting that a trial court must employ a dual stan-
dard, considering the likely effect of conduct upon a reasonable person's ability to
work, as well as the actual effect on the plaintiff).
121. Dockter, 913 F.2d at 459.
122. See generally, Abrams, supra note 86, at 1203-09.
123. See, e.g., J. Alexander Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield
Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. Ray. 544 (1980) (analyzing rape
shield statutes in 46 American jurisdictions); Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988). Congress, by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act, overturned the Supreme Court's ruling in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125 (1976), which held that exclusion of disabilities caused by pregnancy from
an employer's general coverage disability plan did not constitute discrimination
based on sex. See Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.
669, 678 (1983). Congress also rejected the Court's reasoning that differential treat-
ment of pregnancy is not gender-based discrimination because only women can be-
come pregnant. Id. at 684. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act makes it clear that
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proach which considers these differences is the only way to assure
women equality under the law since any other approach judges wo-
men by inherently male standards. 24 Clearly, since Title VII is
meant to eliminate discrimination resulting from firmly entrenched
social behavior, adjudicating Title VII cases with standards which
simply reflect those entrenched behaviors is pointless.
On the other hand, there are legitimate arguments against
adoption of a "reasonable woman" standard. Although Title VII is
not a fault-based tort scheme,X25 there seems something inherently
unfair in holding a man responsible for an offense he did not realize
he was committing. This concern is particularly relevant since pas-
sage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, with its provisions for increased
recovery for damages. 126 Moreover, the acknowledgement of gen-
der difference under the law may not result in only benign conse-
quences. Acknowledging women's differences from men may ignore
women's differences from each other, and result in the assumption
that all reasonable women will perceive a situation similarly, re-
gardless of differences in race, age, class or sexual orientation.' 27
Thus, the reasonable woman standard may encourage gender stere-
otyping and focus on the victim's behavior rather than on the perpe-
trator's actions.
Moreover, the reasonable woman standard seems to hark back
to the days when women were perceived as needing special treat-
ment in the workplace because of their allegedly more delicate na-
tures.128 Such notions of special treatment impeded women's
the exclusion of pregnancy coverage from an otherwise inclusive benefits plan is dis-
criminatory. Id.
124. MacKinnon, supra note 22, at 1286-89. Professor MacKinnon cited instances
when this difference theory is workable, but also when it is not. Id. at 1288-89.
125. See Adler & Peirce, supra note 74, at 814-15 & n.238.
126. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.). In particular, under § 102 of the Act, a plaintiff may recover
punitive damages upon demonstrating that the defendant engaged in practices with
malice or reckless indifference. 105 Stat. at 1073.
127. See generally Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (acknowl-
edging that there exists "a broad range of viewpoints among women as a group", but
that women do share "common concerns which men do not necessarily share");
Cheryl L. Dragel, Note, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: Should the Ninth
Circuit's "Reasonable Woman" Standard Be Adopted?, 11 J. L. & COMM. 237, 254
(1992) (noting that a reasonable woman standard risks reinforcing notions of sexual
difference and of women needing special treatment).
128. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding the conviction of
an employer who violated a state statute prohibiting employment of women for more
than ten hours a day). The Supreme Court wrote, "[Wioman's physical structure,
and the functions she performs in consequence thereof, justify special legislation re-
stricting or qualifying the conditions under which she should be permitted to toil."
Id. at 420. "[I]t is still true that in the struggle for subsistence she is not an equal
competitor with her brother." Id. at 422.
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struggle for equality in employment in the past because of the pa-
tronizing assumptions underlying them. Although current cultural
consciousness might prevent open assertion of such patronizing at-
titudes, many commentators prefer an androgynous reasonable per-
son standard.129 Under this standard, the basic definition of
personhood is expanded to include either male or female perspec-
tives, considered on an equal footing.130 This is apparently the ap-
proach of the EEOC in its most recent policy guidance.' 3 '
Requiring Psychological Harm
The degree of harm needed to constitute an actionable sexual
harassment claim is closely tied to the problem of finding an appro-
priate standard for assessing those claims. In Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., the United States Supreme Court recently took a ma-
jor step toward resolving the degree of harm necessary to constitute
an actionable Title VII claim.13 2 Until Harris, the only guidance
from the Supreme Court on this issue came in Vinson, where the
Court carefully noted that trivial claims are not actionable. ' 3 3 The
Vinson Court adopted the reasoning of Henson v. City of Dundee,
which held that an actionable sexual harassment claim must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive "to alter the conditions of employ-
ment and create an abusive working environment." 13 4
The Harris decision resolved the issue of whether a plaintiff
must demonstrate that she suffered psychological harm in order to
establish a cause of action under Title VII. 135 In Harris, the Court
held that "Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct
leads to a nervous breakdown."'136 The facts of Harris fit a classic
hostile environment pattern. The plaintiff, Teresa Harris, was a
rental manager at Forklift Systems, Inc.137 Her boss and president
of the company, Charles Hardy, directed sexist slurs at Harris and
other female employees and requested that they perform humiliat-
129. See, e.g., Dragel, supra note 127, at 253-54 (preferring a reasonable person
standard which fully encompasses the experiences of both men and women).
130. See Policy Guidance, supra note 46 and accompanying text.
131. Id. at 6690.
132. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 62 U.S.L.W. 4004, 4005 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1993),
rev g and remanding 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992).
133. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1985) (requiring sexual
harassment to be "sufficiently severe or pervasive" to be actionable).
134. Id. at 66-67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.
1982)).
135. Harris, 62 U.S.L.W. at 4005.
136. Id.
137. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,070, at




ing, sexually-related acts on a regular basis.1 3 8 His comments in-
cluded calling Harris a "dumb ass woman," and stating that the
company needed a male rental manager.' 3 9 He asked Harris and
other female employees to retrieve coins from his front pocket, and,
on other occasions, would drop objects on the floor and ask Harris to
pick them up while he made lewd comments about her attire.14 0
Harris testified that after two years of this harassment, she did not
want to go to work, cried frequently, began drinking heavily, and
her family relationships deteriorated as a result of this job-related
stress.' 4 1 Harris eventually informed Hardy that his behavior up-
set her greatly and that she felt she had to quit.142 Hardy promised
to change his behavior and Harris agreed to stay.14 3 Two weeks
later, Hardy insinuated, in front of fellow employees, that Harris
had acquired a new account by promising sexual favors to the cli-
ent.14 4 At this point, Harris quit and filed a sexual harassment
charge.145
The Magistrate of the district court rejected Harris' claim,
holding that a sexually hostile environment did not exist at Forklift
Systems, and that Harris was not seriously psychologically harmed
by Hardy's behavior.' 4 6 The Sixth Circuit Court affirmed the dis-
trict court's ruling without opinion.14 7
The basis on which the district court decided Harris reveals
the cultural biases still affecting the adjudication of sexual harass-
ment claims today. The Magistrate found that Charles Hardy was
a vulgar man who demeaned the female employees of his com-
pany.148 He found further that Harris, like any reasonable woman
manager, was offended by Hardy's unwelcome conduct.149 The
Magistrate found that Hardy was not a credible witness and that
his version of events was suspect.l 5 0 Nevertheless, he concluded
that Hardy's conduct was no more than "annoying and insensitive"
138. Id. at 74,247.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 74,246.




146. Id. at 74,250. Magistrate Sandridge implied that Ms. Harris's claim may
have been actionable in a reasonable woman jurisdiction. Id.
147. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirmed with-
out opinion). Accord Rabidue, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1041 (1987).
148. Harris v. ForkhiA Systems, Inc., 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) % 42,070, at
74,248.
149. Id. at 74,250.
150. Id. at 74,248.
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and was certainly not so severe as to seriously affect Harris' psycho-
logical well-being.151
The Harris court invoked Rabidue as the basis for its deci-
sion.15 2 The district court declined to follow the Ninth Circuit, the
Third Circuit or the EEOC's recommendations, all of which sug-
gested that proof of psychological harm was not necessary to prevail
in a hostile environment action.153 Instead, the Harris court fol-
lowed Rabidue, holding that lack of demonstrable psychological
harm defeated the plaintiffs sexual harassment claim.15 4
The central problem with the district court's analysis in Har-
ris was that, while the Magistrate apparently applied a reasonable
woman standard to judge the defendant's conduct, the court's com-
ments indicate that the standard was not applied objectively.
Rather, the court appears to consider Hardy's behavior merely ado-
lescent in nature rather than actively discriminatory.15 For exam-
ple, the court rationalized Hardy's insinuation that Harris traded
sexual favors for accounts. According to the court, while that state-
ment was "truly gross and offensive," it was not, however, made in
front of clients, only in front of fellow employees.156 Clearly, the
Magistrate evaluated Hardy's conduct from a perspective other
than that of a reasonable victim - man or woman.
The court's lack of understanding also manifests itself in the
Magistrate's refusal to recognize that behavior like Hardy's can
cause psychological harm, notwithstanding a plaintiff's testimony
to the contrary. This lack of understanding is also reflected in the
Harris court's reliance on the fact that other employees were aware
of Hardy's offensive behavior but were not as disturbed by it as
Harris. 15 7 The Magistrate cited the lack of complaints by other fe-
male employees as evidence that the environment was not suffi-
ciently hostile to cause psychological harm.15 8 At best, this
analysis reflects an incomplete understanding of the politics of sex
and power in the American workplace.
The Supreme Court decided that psychological harm is not a
prerequisite to a hostile environment claim under Title VII, re-
jecting the position of three circuits which, at least prior to the Har-
ris decision, required proof of psychological harm. In the Eleventh
151. Id. at 74,250.
152. Id. at 74,249-50.
153. See infra notes 166-167 and accompanying text.
154. Harris, 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,070, at 74,250.
155. Id.
156. Id.




Circuit, an actionable claim required that the behavior in question
seriously affected the psychological well-being of the plaintiff.i59
As suggested above, in Rabidue, the Sixth Circuit also maintained
that, for a claim to be actionable, the charged sexual harassment
must have had a serious negative psychological effect on the plain-
tiff.160 The Sixth Circuit followed Rabidue in Highlander v. KF.C.
Nat'l Management Co. 161 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
cited Rabidue with approval in Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler
Plymouth. 162
Perhaps the circuits which required psychological harm to es-
tablish a Title VII claim intended to guard against trivial com-
plaints. Similarly, the EEOC seeks to guard against trivial
complaints by insisting on a standard which is at least partially
objective. The EEOC stated that, except in a particularly severe in-
stance of sexual harassment, one instance of abuse will not suffice
to create an actionable hostile environment claim.163 According to
the EEOC, actionable claims generally arise from a pattern of abu-
sive behavior. 164 The EEOC concludes that an abusive work envi-
ronment may be actionable under Title VII without concrete
evidence of psychological harm.16 5 "[Ilt is sufficient for the charg-
ing party to show that the harassment was unwelcome and that it
would have substantially affected the work environment of a rea-
sonable person."'166 The Third and Ninth Circuits followed the
EEOC's lead,167 adopting Judge Keith's dissenting position in
Rabidue, wherein Judge Keith asserted that anti-female language
and behavior per se affect the psychological well-being of a reason-
159. See Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1561 (11th Cir.
1987); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982).
160. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 619-20.
161. Id. at 649-50 (citing with approval Rabidue standard).
162. 882 F.2d 1235, 1238 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing with approval Rabidue standard).
Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 213-14 (7th Cir. 1986), is less definitive
than Swanson, but the Seventh Circuit inferred that without psychological harm a
hostile environment claim is not actionable. The Seventh Circuit evaluated Scott's
hostile environment claim with the observation that "there is no evidence whatso-
ever [that] these 'hints' were so ... psychologically debilitating that they affected
Scott's ability to perform on the job," suggesting that debilitation is necessary to
prove a hostile environment claim. Id. at 214.
163. Policy Guidance, supra note 46, at 6690 (stating that hostile environment
claims generally require a pattern of offensive conduct, but a single incident is ac-
tionable if unusually severe).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 6690 n.20 (EEOC explicitly rejected Rabidue's requirement that plain-
tiffs must additionally show that they suffered some degree of psychological injury).
167. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991); Andrews v. City of Phila-
delphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3rd Cir. 1990).
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able woman. 168 Judge Keith considered it redundant to insist upon
proof of subjective psychological harm after the "reasonable wo-
man" standard is met.16 9 Thus, in the Third and the Ninth Cir-
cuits, if conduct was objectively abusive and unwelcome, a
reasonable victim had an actionable claim.
There is a body of psychiatric literature which asserts that
psychological harm does result from job-related sexual harass-
ment.170 Persistent harassment in the workplace can produce
"three categories of symptoms: decline in work performance and at-
titude, psychologic symptoms, and physical symptoms."171 Psycho-
logical symptoms include fear, humiliation, lack of concentration
and loss of self-esteem.172 Physical symptoms can include an-
orexia, loss of sexual interest and insomnia. 173 These symptoms
affect both a woman's motivation for and quality of work, as well as
affecting personal relationships.174
The Supreme Court, in its decision to reverse and remand
Harris, implied that Teresa Harris did not have to tolerate her em-
ployer's abuse.175 The Court clarified the appropriate standard for
judging conduct of a sexual nature, applying the reasonable person/
victim's perspective amalgam suggested in Vinson and in the
EEOC Guidelines, rather than the reasonable woman standard. 176
Again, the Court made it clear that a woman need not prove she
suffered psychological harm to prevail in a hostile environment
claim.177
In clarifying the appropriate standard for judging hostile envi-
ronment claims, the Supreme Court reiterated its position in Vin-
son, that to distinguish frivolous claims from legitimate claims, a
court should evaluate claims from the victim's viewpoint and the
viewpoint of an objective reasonable person.178 Thus, to be actiona-
ble, a claim must involve abuse behavior which a reasonable per-
son, as well as the victim, deems pervasive enough to create a
168. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 627 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) (Keith, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 627 (Keith, J., dissenting).
170. See generally Ben Bursten, Psychiatric Injury in the Women's Workplace, 13
BuLL. Am. AcAD. PSYcHIATRY & L. 399, 405-06 (1985).




175. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 62 U.S.L.W. 4004 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1993), rev'g
and remanding 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992).
176. Id. at 4005.
177. Id. Even the respondent, Forklift, conceded that "a requirement that the




discriminatory work environment.' 79 By declining to espouse the
reasonable woman standard, ostensibly used by the lower courts in
this case, the Supreme Court may have sought to avoid the dangers
inherent in a separate standard. Instead of establishing a separate
standard based on sex, the Court attempted to strike a balance be-
tween objective and subjective viewpoints by stressing that, if the
victim's perspective differs too radically from that of a reasonable
person, a claim may not be actionable.'SO Thus, if the victim is con-
siderably more sensitive than an objectively reasonable person, the
Court might infer that the environment was not sufficiently hostile
to maintain a sexual harassment claim. A successful claim arises
when the sensitivities of the victim and an objectively reasonable
person are similar.
This standard is too vague to be easily applied in every case.
Consequently, the Supreme Court makes it clear that courts must
consider all the circumstances in a given case, including the "fre-
quency of the offending conduct, its severity, whether it is physi-
cally threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work per-
formance."' 8 Psychological harm is a relevant factor, but not the
sole factor or even a necessary factor.' 8 2 Thus, the district court in
Harris misread Title VII and Vinson when it considered psychologi-
cal harm a necessary factor in the face of the other factors present
in that case.
Stressing that a sexual harassment plaintiff need not sustain
psychological harm to prevail in a hostile environment claim, Jus-
tice O'Connor delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court, assert-
ing "Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to
a nervous breakdown."l8 3 In fact, Title VII was intended to prevent
the infliction of psychological harm because of one's membership in
a protected category. An abusive environment which does not pro-
duce visible psychological harm can still "detract from employees'
job performances, discourage employees from remaining on the job,
or keep them from advancing in their careers."1 8 4 Furthermore,
work environments which can be classified as abusive, whether
they actually produce psychological harm or not, may violate "Title
179. Id. As Justice O'Connor pointed out, the standard enunciated "takes a mid-
dle path between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requir-
ing the conduct to cause tangible psychological injury." Id.




184. Id. This is an important part of the opinion because the Court rejects the
requirement that a plaintiffs job performance must actually suffer.
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VII's broad rule of workplace equality."185 The Supreme Court un-
equivocally stated that Title VII does not require concrete proof of
psychological harm.
In Harris, the Supreme Court suggested that the parameters
of actionable hostile environment claims are more expansive than
suggested by Vinson, where the environment was permeated by
physical as well a psychological abuse.186 Teresa Harris, unlike
Mechelle Vinson, was not subjected to physical harassment. Never-
theless, the Supreme Court found that a reasonable person would
perceive the work environment at Forklift Systems as an impedi-
ment to optimal and equal job performance. This is sufficient to
sustain a hostile environment sexual harassment claim. Sidestep-
ping the issue of whether psychological harm is endemic to such a
work environment, the Supreme Court decided that proof of psycho-
logical harm is not the linchpin on which an actionable claim hangs.
In Harris, the Supreme Court elucidated definitively that Title VII
was meant to prevent psychological harm from occurring rather
than merely compensating the victim after it occurs.' 8 7 Indeed,
with this ruling, the national consciousness about what constitutes
sexual harassment appears to have passed another threshold.
Remedies
Until recently, remedies for actionable claims under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allowed successful plaintiffs to obtain
injunctive relief as well as back pay, front pay, attorney's fees and
costs.' 8 8 Unlike remedies for racial harassment under the Civil
185. Harris, 62 U.S.L.W. at 4005.
186. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
187. Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, wrote that the test for an actionable
claim is "whether working conditions have been discriminatorily altered." Harris,
62 U.S.L.W. at 4006 (Scalia, J., concurring). His concurrence reinforces the notion
that the analysis should focus primarily on the defendant's behavior rather than the
victim's psychological state. Despite his dissatisfaction with the list of factors set
forth by Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia lamented that he "know[s] of no alternative
to the course the Court today has taken." Id. Justice Scalia expressed discomfort
with the court's analysis since it adds "little certitude." Id.
Justice Ginsburg offered her insight in a separate concurring opinion by charac-
terizing the issue as, "whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not ex-
posed .... " Using this approach, an actionable claim would lie if "the harassment so
altered working conditions as to 'ma[k]e it more difficult to do the job.'" Id. (Gins-
burg, J., concurring) (quoting Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349
(6th Cir. 1988)). Justice Ginsburg's approach makes an analogy with equal protec-
tion jurisprudence where "'an exceedingly persuasive justification' for a gender-
based classification" must exist. Id. (quoting Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455,
461 (1981)).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-5(g) (1988) (equitable relief was available, while compensa-
tory and punitive damages were not); see also Estrich, Sex at Work, supra note 21,
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Rights Act of 1866,189 however, Title VII did not allow a plaintiff to
recover punitive damages or compensation for emotional distress.
Nor did Title VII allow for a jury trial - a distinct disadvantage at
a time when many magistrates perceive sexual harassment claims
as not quite legitimate. 190 The redress available under this statute,
then, implied that the harm was insufficient to warrant the same
compensation granted to victims of racial harassment.
With the growing awareness of the effects of sexual harass-
ment on a victim came a concomitant awareness of the need for ex-
panded remedies. When the Civil Rights Act of 1991191 amended
various antidiscrimination statutes, 192 including Title VII, it
granted sex discrimination plaintiffs the right to a jury trial1 93 and
to recovery of compensatory and punitive damages.19 4 The Act lim-
its compensatory damages to "future pecuniary losses, emotional
pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of
life, and other nonpecuniary losses .. .. "195
This amendment to Title VII clearly reflects an increased
awareness of how sexual harassment can be emotionally and finan-
cially destructive. However, sex discrimination claims apparently
still lack the legitimacy of race discrimination claims. For example,
the 1991 Civil Rights Act placed a cap on the amount a plaintiff can
recover in compensatory and punitive damages.196 Thus, a sex dis-
crimination plaintiff, forced to sue under Title VII as amended by
the 1991 Act, faces statutory limitations on recovery which do not
apply to a race discrimination plaintiff suing under the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.197 These damage limits vary with the size of an em-
ployer's business.198
at 855-58 (explaining that equitable relief was available under Title VII, while com-
pensatory and punitive damages were not).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
190. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,070, at
74,246 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (magistrate's report after trial and recommendation to the
district judge); Edward J. Costello, Jr., Sexual Harassment After the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, 23 U. WEST L.A. L, Ra. 21, 33-34 (1992).
191. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (an omnibus statute codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
192. Costello, supra note 190, at 31.
193. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(c) (making jury trials available if plaintiffs
seek compensatory or punitive damages).
194. Id. § 102(b) (allowing punitive damages, though only upon evidence that the
respondent acted with "malice or reckless indifference").
195. Id. § 102(b)(3).
196. Id. § 102(b)(3)(A),(B),(C),(D).
197. Compare Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(bX3) with 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
198. A company with 15 to 100 employees is liable for no more than $50,000 in
compensatory and punitive damages; a company with 101 to 200 employees is liable
for no more than $100,000; a company with 201 to 500 employees is liable for no
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Congress placed these damage limits on all sex discrimination
claims brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1991.199 These caps
reflect the reluctance of the legislative and judicial establishment to
view sex discrimination as an offense with an unlimited ability to
adversely affect a victim. Thus, the increased potential for recovery
available to sex discrimination victims today represents only the
current stage of consciousness about sexual harassment and its ef-
fects, rather than the ultimate evolution of societal consciousness
about the adverse effects of sex discrimination.
A further limit on recovery imposed by the 1991 Act is its ban
on compensatory and punitive damages for victims asserting dispa-
rate impact claims.200 However, the cap described here does not
apply to damages recoverable under section 706(g) of Title VII such
as back pay, or to past pecuniary losses such as medical ex-
penses. 20' Whether these caps apply to front pay is unclear from
the wording of the Act.202
Despite its caps on remedies, the 1991 Civil Rights Act has
increased the legitimacy of sexual harassment claims by creating a
Glass Ceiling Commission.203 This commission, made up of
twenty-one appointed members, is authorized to make recommen-
dations designed to eliminate "artificial barriers to the advance-
ment of women and minorities . "...-204 Concomitant with the
creation of this committee, the Act creates an annual award for em-
ployers who make exceptional progress in eliminating these barri-
ers.2 05 These provisions clearly reflect increased Congressional
resolve to grant legitimacy to sex discrimination claims, including
claims of sexual harassment.
I. International Laws of Sexual Harassment
Surveys conducted around the globe document the pervasive-
ness of sexual harassment.20 6 From Nairobi to Stockholm, sexual
harassment in the workplace is an issue for women and, to a lesser
more than $200,000; and a company with over 500 employees is liable for no more
$300,000. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(bX3)A),(D).
199. Id. § 102(bX3).
200. Id. § 102(aXl).
201. Id. § 102(bX2).
202. Id. § 102(a),(b).
203. Id. §§ 201-210.
204. Id. § 202(a) & (b).
205. Id. § 205.
206. Gloria Gorden, A Worldwide Look at Sexual Harassment, 12 Com. WoRLD
15 (1991). For surveys of reported sexual harassment in countries around the world
see DxEasT, supra note 8, at 65-173.
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extent, men.207 Studies show that harassers do not victimize wo-
men on the basis of their physical attractiveness, but rather harass
individuals who are the most vulnerable.20 While some commen-
tators criticize United States law as reflecting puritan notions of
sex,
2 0 9 governments around the world are realizing that sexual har-
assment is not about sex, but about sex as a vehicle to discriminate,
to subjugate women, and to assert power.21o
The sexual harassment regulations developed in the United
States and subsequent case law clearly influenced legal develop-
ments in other countries.2 11 In 1991, the European Community
adopted a nonbinding code of practice on sexual harassment.212
Some individual countries have gone beyond this Code. Both
France and the United Kingdom have enacted legislation or adjudi-
cated cases on the subject.2 13 Other EC countries, as well as Aus-
tralia, Canada and New Zealand, have legal mechanisms for the
redress of sexual harassment claims.2 14 Even in Japan, a society
known for its respect for authority rather than litigiousness, a court
found that crude remarks by a boss to his employee, which caused
her to leave the job, warranted payment of approximately
$12,500.215
207. See generally DIGEST, supra note 8, at 65-173. A British survey, of 1000
workers found that sexual harassment is overwhelmingly directed at women, and
perpetrated by men. See Fiona Thompson, Running the Gauntlet of Going to Work,
THE FiN. TIMEs (LONDON), Mar. 16, 1989, at 13 (discussing a London School of Eco-
nomics study which found that the age of the victim was not a factor in the incidence
of sexual harassment, and three quarters of all incidents went unreported).
208. Michael Rubenstein, Dealing with Sexual Harassment at Work: The Experi-
ence of Industrialized Countries, DIGEST, supra note 8, at 8; see also MICHAEL RUBEN.
sTEm, TH DiGNiTrY OF WOMEN AT Woic A REPORT ON THE PROBLEM OF SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE MFmER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN CozmuNrrEs 15 (1988)
[hereinafter RUBENSTEIN, DiaNrrv OF WOMEN AT WORK] (citing studies conducted in
Belgium and the Netherlands which found sexual harassment was linked to work
status, and most likely to be directed towards young women, unmarried, divorced or
separated women, and women working in traditionally male jobs).
209. See Alan Raybould, Europeans Amused by U.S. Prurience Over Clinton Scan-
dal, Reuter, Jan. 28, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File.
210. See discussion infra part IV.
211. See Sex Harassment at Work Grows as Global Concern, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1,
1992, at A5 (attributing influence to the United States). Ms. Constance Thomas, an
International Labor Office attorney, noted that "no longer can government, trade
unions, workers or employers say, 'It's an issue that we don't have to deal with' and
call it a U.S. problem." Id. See also DIGEST, supra note 8, at 165-70 (discussing the
role of the EEOC guidelines).
212. Commission Recommendation on Protecting the Dignity of Women and Men
at Work, 1992 O.J. (L 49) 1, 3-8, reprinted in DIGEST, supra note 8, at 31-39.
213. See infra text accompanying notes 278-319.
214. See generally discussion infra part IV; see also DIGEST, supra note 8, at 65-
173.
215. Steven R. Weisman, Landmark Harassment Case in Japan, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
17, 1992, at A3 (discussing "seku hara", the term for sexual harassment in Japan).
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A United Nations
The United Nations, though a leader in many areas, has never
been a leader in women's rights.216 Concerns over international
boundaries, war, and peace have consumed the young organization
and left to the periphery concerns of women.217 The legal status
and treatment of women raise difficult issues that cross into the
"private" realm within state sovereignty. 218 The 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights included women when it guaranteed
rights to "everyone."219 Sex is specifically mentioned in Article 2:
"Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status."220
Despite this language, women are accorded second class sta-
tus in many countries. Gender-based violence, such as female in-
fanticide, genital mutilation, rape and murder continues to violate
women's human rights.22l Former United States vice presidential
candidate Geraldine Ferraro succinctly identified the difficulties
women have convincing the international community to address
women's rights:
Although the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
nominally includes women, the icon of human rights abuse has
been a man behind bars, tortured for speaking his mind. Abuse
unique to women has been dismissed - as traditional practice,
as too common to worry about, as less important than other
things. These are family problems, men say, and the family lies
beyond international jurisdiction.222
The report quotes lawyer Yukiko Tsunoda as stating that "[slexual harassment is a
big problem in Japan, and we hope this will send a signal to men that they have to be
more careful." Id. The report also notes two previous harassment cases which the
plaintiffs won because the male defendants did not appear in court. Id.
216. Even within the United Nations sexual harassment is a fact of life for UN
employees like so many other workers. A sexual harassment case against a high
ranking UN official, the first such claim under the UN internal justice system, was
reported in The New York Times. Tamar Lewin, UN Furor: Harassment is Investi-
gated, N.Y. TImEs, Dec. 20, 1992, at 37.
217. Charlesworth et. al., supra note 3, at 615 (employing a feminist analysis of
international law).
218. Id. at 625-27. The "public" sphere is generally regarded as the province of
international law, whereas matters "private" to states are considered within their
domestic jurisdiction. Id.
219. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. G.A. Res. 217(111), art. 2
(1948), reprinted in BARRY E. CARTER & PmLLw R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw:
SELECTED DocuMEmrs 352 (1991) [hereinafter DocUMENTS].
220. Id.
221. See supra note 25.




In 1979, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ("Convention") was en-
acted, although the United States has not ratified this Conven-
tion.223 Forty of the 105 ratifying countries expressed reservations
to the Convention based primarily on religious objections. 224 By
contrast, only four countries registered reservations to the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.225
As several feminist Australian professors commented, even at the
UN, "discrimination against women is somehow regarded as more
'natural' and acceptable than racial discrimination."226
Sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination was specifi-
cally mentioned in the 1985 draft of The Nairobi Forward Looking
Strategies for The Advancement of Women. 227 The draft states,
"[aippropriate measures should be taken to prevent sexual harass-
ment on the job and sexual exploitation in specific jobs."22s Subse-
quently, the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, the committee responsible for im-
plementing the Convention, examined gender-specific violence in-
cluding the mental harm associated with sexual harassment.229
The Committee suggested "penal sanctions... compensatory provi-
sions [and] ... preventative measures."23 0
Yet, this Convention, and women's issues generally, receive
remarkably little attention internationally. A feminist critique of
international law suggests this reflects a deliberate concern for
223. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Wo-
men, U.N. GA. Res. 280 (XXXIV 1979), 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980), reprinted in Docvu-
mNrrs, supra note 219, at 399 (adopted by General Assembly of the United Nations
on December 18, 1979 entered into force on Sept. 3, 1981).
224. Charlesworth et al., supra note 3, at 632-33.
225. Id. at 633.
226. Id. at 634.
227. See DIGEST, supra note 8, at 41 (excerpting from United Nations, The Nairobi
Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women and Concrete Measures
to Overcome Obstacles to the Achievement of the Goals and Objectives of the United
Nations Decade for Women for the period 1986 to the Year 2000, adopted by the
World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievement of the United Nations
Decade for Women, Nairobi, Kenya (1985)).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 24.
230. Id. at 42 (reprinting excerpts from General Recommendation No 19: Vio-
lence Against Women, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Wo-
men, 11th Sess., U.N. Doc. CEDAW/1992/L.1/Add.15 (1992)).
For discussion of women's presence in other human rights fora see Alan Riding,
Women Seize Focus At Rights Forum, N.Y. TamEs, June 16, 1993, at A3 (noting that
Secretary of State Warren Christopher, at the World Conference on Human Rights,
announced that President Clinton would seek ratification of the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women). The reporter noted
that "[women, .. . have emerged as easily the strongest and most effective lobby
...." Id.
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matters of state, and a policy of ignoring private, domestic matters
considered internal to the country.2 3 ' According to Professor Hil-
ary Charlesworth, "[i]f violence against women were considered by
the international legal system to be as shocking as violence against
people for their political ideas, women would have considerable sup-
port in their struggle."23 2 This reluctance to interfere in a state's
internal matters absent compelling justification, or solely for self
defense, will never permit UN intercession on behalf of women.
B. European Community
The development of sexual harassment law in the European
Community parallels developments within the United States. Just
as in the United States, initially the EC did not recognize sexual
harassment or "sexual blackmail."233 Although equality was not
originally mandated by the EC, the Treaty of Rome, which estab-
lished the European Economic Community, included a mandate for
equal pay for men and women known as Article 119.234 Article 119
states "telach Member State shall during the first stage ensure and
subsequently maintain the application of the principle that men
and women should receive equal pay for equal work."23 5
In 1976, the EC passed the Equal Treatment Directive. 23 6
This directive outlawed sex discrimination, and like all directives,
called upon member states to implement appropriate state legisla-
tion to achieve the objectives of the Directive. The Directive states:
1. The purpose of this Directive is to put into effect in the Mem-
ber States the principle of equal treatment for men and women
as regards access to employment, including promotion, and to
vocational training and as regards working conditions and, on
the conditions referred to in paragraph 2, social security. This
principle is hereinafter referred to as 'the principle of equal
treatment.'
231. Charlesworth et al., supra note 3, at 629.
232. Id.
233. For a description of the development of sexual harassment law in the EC see
EVELYN EuIs, EuROPEAN CoMMUNIvT SEX EQUALITY LAw 149 (1991) (discussing the
evolution of the treatment of sexual harassment in the European Community). Vari-
ous terms are used to describe sexual harassment around the world including "un-
wanted intimacy" in Netherlands, "sexual molestation" in Italy, and "sexual
blackmail" in France. DIGEST, supra note 8, at 10.
234. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EuRoPEAN ECONOMIC CoMMUNITY, art. 119 [EEC
TREATY] (also referred to as Treaty of Rome). For a discussion of the application of
art. 119 see ELLIS, supra note 233, at 38. The case Defrenne v. Sabena, 43/75 [1976]
ECR 455, expands on how art. 119 should be interpreted within the "social objec-
tives" of the community. Id. at 41.
235. Id. at 38 (quoting EEC TREATY art. 119).
236. Directive 76/207, 1976 OJ (L 39/40). For a discussion of the Equal Treatment
Directive see ELIs, supra note 233, at 134.
1993]
Law and Inequality
2. With a view to ensuring the progressive implementation of
the principle of equal treatment in matters of social security,
the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, will
adopt provisions defining its substance, its scope and the ar-
rangement for its application.2 37
The Directive continues in Article 2: "For the purposes of the fol-
lowing provisions, the principle of equal treatment shall mean that
there shall be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex
either directly or indirectly by reference in particular to marital or
family status."2 38
In 1984, the EC published a non-binding Council of Ministers
recommendation, intended to eliminate existing inequalities affect-
ing working women and to promote "positive action for women."23 9
The Council's recommendation also called for positive action to "re-
spect . . . the dignity of women at the workplace."240 The recom-
mendation encouraged industry to make suggestions to further
achievement of these goals.241 However, the recommendation did
not explicitly recognize sexual harassment as either a separate
wrong or as a form of discrimination.
The Council recommended to member states:
1. To adopt a positive action policy designed to eliminate ex-
isting inequalities affecting women in working life and to pro-
mote a better balance between the sexes in employment.
4. To take steps to ensure that positive action includes as far as
possible actions having a bearing on... respect for the dignity
of women at the workplace. 24 2
In 1986, the European Parliament, then an entity without di-
rect power, resolved that sexual harassment was a form of violence
against women. 2 43 This occurred the same year as the United
States Supreme Court decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vin-
son.2 44 The Resolution referred to the United Nations Convention
237. Directive 76/207, 1976 OJ (L 39/40), reprinted in ELLIS, supra note 233, at
135.
238. Id.




243. Resolution on Violence Against Women, 1986 OJ (C 176) 73. The power of
parliament was expanded beyond just a consultative body by the Single European
Act in 1987, 25 I. L. M. 503 (1986). See generally RALPH H. FoLsoM, EURoPEAN COM-
MuNIrY LAw 25-66 (1992) (discussing the allocation of power between the European
Community Council of Ministers, Commission and Parliament); see also NICHOLAS
COLCHESTER & DAVID BucHAN, EuRoPowER 14 (1990); RICHARD SCHAFFER ET AL., IN-
TERNATONAL BusmNEss LAw AND ITS ENvmRONmT 70 (1993) (discussing the struc-
ture of the European Community).
244. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Wo-
men,245 and noted a connection between eliminating inequality and
eliminating violence against women.2 46 The Resolution specifically
addressed sexual harassment and called for study of the financial
costs associated with it. The Resolution states:
38. Whereas sexual harassment can be seen as non-respect of
the principle of equal treatment with regard to access to em-
ployment and promotion, and working conditions, calls on the
Commission to examine national labour and anti-discrimina-
tion legislation with a view to determining its applicability to
such cases and, in so far as existing legislation may be deemed
inadequate, to propose a directive to complete existing
legislation;
39. Calls on the Council of Ministers meeting on the subject of
labour legislation to take all the necessary steps to harmonize
laws on sexual blackmail at work in the different Member
states of the Community and while awaiting this harmoniza-
tion, calls on national authorities to strive to achieve a legal
definition of sexual harassment so that victims of such attacks
will have a clearly defined basis on which to lodge complaints;
247
The Resolution called for education on the issue of sexual harass-
ment and advocated drafting codes of practice to address sexual
harassment.24s Unions and professional organizations were en-
couraged to become involved.2 49 The EC Parliament also called for
a study on the impact of "sexual blackmail" and to "harmonize laws
on sexual blackmail at work in the different Member States of the
Community."250 "Harmonization" was a precursor to the single
market program calling for greater uniformity among the member
states' laws.25 1 However, the EC did not actually issue a sexual
harassment directive or regulation despite a number of calls for
such legislation by experts in the field.252
245. U.N. G.A. Res. 280 (XXXIV 1979), 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980), reprinted in Docu-
MENTs, supra note 219, at 399.
246. Resolution on Violence Against Women, 1986 OJ (C 176) 73-83, reprinted in
DIGEST, supra note 8, at 26-28.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 27-28.
250. Id.
251. Id. For discussion of harmonization see COLCHESTER & BucHAN, supra, note
243, at 82-84. For a discussion of the assessment of progress see A Rude Awakening:
A Survey of the European Community, THE ECONOiuST, July 3, 1993, at 5.
252. See RuBENsmiN, DiGmry oF WoMEN AT WORK, supra note 208, at 9. Mr.
Rubenstein, in his 1987 report, called for a sexual harassment directive, stating:
The approach of this report throughout is to suggest a legal framework
which will reduce the need for litigation by encouraging the prevention
of sexual harassment rather than stimulating law suits by concentrat-
ing on sanctions after the damage has been inflicted. It must be em-
phasized, however, that such a preventative approach will not succeed
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In May 1990, the EC Council of Ministers passed a resolution
on "the protection of the dignity of women and men at work."253
The resolution explicitly defined sexual harassment:
1. Affirms that conduct of a sexual nature, or other conduct
based on sex affecting the dignity of women and men at work,
including conduct of superiors and colleagues, constitutes an in-
tolerable violation of the dignity of workers or trainees and is
unacceptable if:
(a) such conduct is unwanted, unreasonable and offensive to
the recipient;
(b) a person's rejection of, or submission to, such conduct on the
part of employers or workers (including superiors or colleagues)
is used explicitly or implicitly as a basis for a decision which
affects that person's access to vocational training, access to em-
ployment, continued employment, promotion, salary or any
other employment decisions;
and/or
(c) such conduct creates an intimidating, hostile or humiliating
working environment for the recipient; .... 254
This Resolution also called for development of a Code of Con-
duct by July 1991.255 In November 1991, the EC enacted a non-
binding Code of Practice stating "[t]he action[s] of the Member
States, in thus initiating and pursuing positive measures designed
to create a climate at work in which women and men respect one
another's human integrity, should serve as an example to the pri-
vate sector."256 The Code states in part:
Sexual harassment means unwanted conduct of a sexual na-
ture, or other conduct based upon sex affecting the dignity of
men and women at work. This can include unwelcome physical,
verbal or non-verbal conduct. Thus, a range of behaviour may
be considered to constitute sexual harassment. It is unaccept-
able if such conduct is unwanted, unreasonable and offensive to
the recipient; a person's rejection of or submission to such con-
duct on the part of employers or workers (including superiors or
colleagues) is used explicitly or implicitly as a basis for a deci-
sion which affects that person's access to vocational training or
to employment, continued employment, promotion, salary or
any other employment decisions; and/or such conduct creates
an intimidating, hostile or humiliating working environment
for the recipient. The essential characteristic of sexual harass-
ment is that it is unwanted by the recipient, that it is for each
individual to determine what behavior is acceptable to them
without legislation to stimulate change. An effective law will focus at-
tention on the problem.
Id.
253. 1990 OJ (C 157) 3-4, reprinted in DmnzsT, suprm note 8, at 29-30.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. 1992 OJ (L 49) 1-8, reprinted in DiGEsT, supra note 8, at 31-39.
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and what they regard as offensive. Sexual attention becomes
sexual harassment if it is persisted in once it has been made
clear that it is regarded by the recipient as offensive, although
one incident of harassment may constitute harassment if suffi-
ciently serious. It is the unwanted nature of the conduct which
distinguishes sexual harassment from friendly behaviour,
which is welcome and mutual.25 7
The aim of the Code is to "give practical guidance" to employ-
ers, trade unions and employees. It is applicable to both the public
and private sectors. 258 It focuses on education and prevention of
harassment rather than on compensating victims. The Code recom-
mends developing policy statements, communicating the policy to
workers, and training.25 9 The Code also recommends a complaint
investigation and disciplinary procedure. 26o In 1994, the Commis-
sion is scheduled to report on all measures enacted and taken by
industry.261 On December 19, 1991, the Council endorsed the Com-
mission's Code of Practice without modifying the original Code.262
The problem with the Code's definition and explanation is that
women have the burden of notifying their superiors and co-workers
about inappropriate conduct. As with United States laws, "wel-
comeness" focuses on the conduct of a complainant. The Code's def-
inition does not address the problem that sexual bantering and
touching may in fact be welcomed by some women in the workplace.
Despite the acquiescence of some, this sort of behavior may create a
hostile environment for other workers. This test especially burdens
individuals who not only must deal with hostile environments, but
with the difficulty of succeeding in nontraditional occupations such
as female firefighters or carpenters, or male nurses or secretaries.
The Code is not binding, nor does it provide a legal basis to
ensure financial recovery for victims. The focus is on prevention of
sexual harassment. This may be in response to research suggesting
that survivors of sexual harassment primarily seek to end the har-
assment. 26 3 Also, European countries are less litigious than the
257. Id. at 33.
258. Id. at 32.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 31.
262. 1992 OJ (C 27) 1, reprinted in DIGEST, supra note 8, at 40.
263. Ms. Jayne Monkhouse of the British Equal Opportunity Commission states,
"Most women who have been subjected to sexual harassment just want it to stop -
they don't want to get their pound of flesh at a tribunal." Lucy Kellaway, Getting
Sex Out of the Office, THE FIN. Tiuzs (LoNDON), Oct. 23, 1991, at 13, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, FINTME File; see also UK: Institute of Personnel Manage-
ment Reports that Harassment Still Goes Largely Unpunished, Reuter Textline, Oct.
8, 1992, available in LXIS, WORLD Library, ALLNWS File (stating that people
who are sexually harassed generally just want it to stop).
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United States.264 The notion that everyone should have his or her
day in court is unfamiliar in Europe and, in some instances, is not
allowed.265
The choice of a non-binding code to address sexual harass-
ment, rather than a directive or regulation which would have been
directly enforceable, is significant. The European Community has
several options for legislation.26 6 A directive requires each member
state to adopt its own legislation to conform to the directive stan-
dards, whereas a regulation is directly applicable to all member
states. 267 The European Community's difficulties with the Maas-
tricht Treaty, which is centered on the single currency, central
bank, and the principle of subsidiarity,268 militated against taking
a stronger position on sexual harassment which would tread on
sensitive issues of national autonomy. 26 9
European Community states have experimented with differ-
ent approaches to addressing sexual harassment - from criminal-
izing conduct, to relying on laws prohibiting discrimination, to
ignoring the problem.2 70 There is no uniformity between member
states. This article advocates an EC directive or regulation on sex-
ual harassment so that all sexual harassment would be prohibited
throughout the European Community. Such a directive would send
a message to businesses and individuals that harassment is an im-
portant concern requiring a standardized approach.
264. For a comparison of litigation in different countries see Christopher J. Whe-
lan, Labor Law and Comparative Law, 63 TEx. L. Ray. 1425 (1985); see also P.S.
Atiyah, Tort Law and the Alternatives: Some Anglo American Comparisons 1987
DUKE L.J. 1002 (1987).
265. Id.
266. See ELUS, supra note 233, at 4.
267. Id. at 4-5.
268. Subsidiarity refers to the concept that decisions should be made at the lowest
level and that the Community governance structure should not become involved in a
member state's concerns. This is analogous to the federal/state tensions in the
United States. See COLCHESTER & BucHAN, supra note 243, at 42, 179, 188 & 236
(giving examples and asserting that language teaching need not be centralized). "If
it can cross frontiers, draft a directive. If it can't, hands off." Id. at 236. However,
that distinction does not answer the question of whether political philosophy about
the role of central government determines whether an issue should be handled at the
state or community level.
269. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992) (completed at
Maastricht, The Netherlands Feb. 7, 1992 and also referred to as the Maastricht
Treaty). The Maastricht Treaty has not yet been implemented.
270. See discussion infra part IV.
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IV. The Status of Sexual Harassment Laws in Various
Countries
A. France
The media in the U.S. and abroad fuel the illusion that the
view of sexual harassment in the United States is odd and an aber-
ration.271 During the Thomas-Hill hearings, French philosopher
Elisabeth Badinter commented that Justice Thomas was vilified for
having sexual desires and expressing them.2 72 Ms. Badinter
blamed a "pitiless feminist Inquisition."273
A recent French poll buttressed the international perception
that the view of sexual harassment in the United States is puritani-
cal.2 74 According to the poll, 20% of French women would not con-
sider it sexual harassment if they were asked to undress during a
job interview. 275 Only 47% thought it would be sexual harassment
if a boss asked them to spend the weekend with him to discuss a
promotion.276 Not all French women share this rather incredible
tolerance for sexual banter or joking. As one French journalist
stated, "[a]ll too many men think that they are being charming
when they are being a pain."277
Despite its professed national ambivalence about sexual har-
assment, France enacted a new 1992 law making sexual harass-
ment a criminal offense.278 The legislation was touted as "the
toughest of its kind in Europe."279 The French Secretary of State
for Women's Rights, Veronique Neiertz, cautioned that not every
advance by an employer is necessarily a criminal offense. 280 Ms.
Neiertz also stated, "We must be careful to condemn sexual harass-
ment without at the same time condemning sex and seduction. If
271. Eduordo Cue, UPI, Feb. 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File
(stating that despite the "encroaching influence of American values" there remain
.significant cultural differences" relating to sexual harassment between France and
the U.S.).
272. Catchpole, supra note 2. Ms. Badinter laments the "unbearable regression
which can only engender more fear and loneliness' and which will not "enlarge femi-
nine dignity." Id. However, French feminists respond to these comments by assert-
ing that sexual intrigue or "galanterie" has been a real problem in France. Id. The
French Association of Violence Against Women receives on average three calls a day
from women seeking assistance. Id.
273. Id.
274. Alan Riding, France Rethinks its Wink at Sex Harassment, N.Y. TmEs, May









we don't, watch out for moralism and the war of the sexes."281 Ac-
cording to Ms. Neiertz, "a good slap in the face" may be the best
course of action. 282 Ms. Neiertz deplores the excesses of American
sexual correctness where even "the slightest wink can be
misinterpreted."28 3
The French legislation consists of two parts: Penal Code sec-
tions and Labor Code sections.284 The Penal Code states: "The ac-
tion of harassing another by using orders or position by threats or
duress to obtain sexual favors by a person who abuses the authority
granted by his position may be punished by a year in prison and a
100,000 Franc fine."285
The power of this legal development is evidenced by an action
brought by a labor union on behalf of a telephone operator who was
fondled by her boss in which the offender received a suspended jail
term.2 8 6 Despite the contempt some French evince for Americans'
view of sexual harassment, the Thomas controversy was educa-
tional and stimulated discussion as well as legal change. Ulti-
mately, it fostered a new public understanding of sexual
harassment as criminal behavior, as reflected in the imposition of a
suspended jail sentence. The French law stands in marked contrast
to U.S. law which makes no attempt to specifically criminalize sex-
ual harassment. 28 7
281. Cue, supra note 271.
282. Riding, supra note 274.
283. Id.
284. See DIGESr, supra note 8, at 97-100.
285. CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] art. 222-23 Titre H (Fr.), available in LEXIS, LOIREG
Library, CODES File (translated by Beverley Earle). In French: "Le fait de harceler
autrui en usant d'ordres, de menaces ou de contraintes, dans le obtenir des faveurs
de nature sexuelle, par une personne abusant de l'autorite que lui conferent ses fonc-
tions, est puni d'un an d'emprisonnement et de 100,000 F d'amende." Id.
286. Barry James, A French Revolution; Judge Gives Suspended Jail Term to
Male Boss for Sexual Harassment, INT'L HERALD Tars., Jan. 18, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, IHT File.
287. See MAcKINNoN, supra note 19, at 161-64 (discussing the criminal nature of
many acts of sexual harassment which should be prosecuted as assault). Professor
Estrich compares U.S. rape laws to sexual harassment law and views both as embod-
ying sexist attitudes about how women should act. Estrich, Sex at Work, supra note
21, at 814-15. Professor Estrich writes:
[Slexism is entrenched in [the] law - one realm where traditional male
prerogatives are most protected, male power most jealously preserved
and female power most jealously limited - it is the area of sex itself
.... In life, this male domain is protected by the wielding of real power
- economic, physical, psychological, and emotional. In law, it is pro-
tected by doctrines of consent, corroboration, fresh complaint and prov-
ocation .... It is protected, in short, by the operation of sexism in law.
Id.
Other countries also use existing criminal laws to address sexual harassment.
For example, in New Zealand criminal indecent assault charges were brought
against the owner of a shop for harassing a foster child, cousin and employees. R. v.
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As a result of changes enacted to the French Labor Code in
1992, workers fired for resisting sexual harassment may be rein-
stated.288 The revised code prohibits employers from demoting or
reducing the salaries of employees who resist sexual harass-
ment. 289 The law states:
Any wage earner should not be sanctioned or laid off for having
to submit or refusing to submit to actions of sexual harassment
by an employer or by his representative or by all persons who
abuse the authority given to them by their position through giv-
ing orders or pressure uttering threats or imposing will or exer-
cising pressure on the worker for the purpose of obtaining
sexual favors or for the benefit of a third party. No worker shall
lose salary or a job because of the previous actions.2 90
Dean, 3 N.Z.L.R. 444 (Wellington Ct. App. 1991). The defendant was a 38 year old
married man with three children who was "highly regarded and respected in the
small rural community...." Id. at 447. The four employees, aged 15, 16 and 18,
alleged that the defendant touched them on their breasts and buttocks when they
were bending over or on ladders. Id. at 446. Initially the defendant stated he be-
lieved he had done nothing wrong, but later conceded he was wrong "particularly
having regard to the age difference between him and the girls affected." Id. at 447.
The court sentenced the defendant to 4 1/2 years in prison. Id. On appeal his sen-
tence was reduced to 3 1/2 years. Id. at 445.
In an Australian case, a woman employee in a bake shop was sexually harassed
by her supervisor. Aldridge v. Booth, 80 A.L.R. 1 (Fed. Ct. 1988). The court held
that the supervisor was acting as an agent to three other respondents who did noth-
ing to stop the harassment. Id. The court ordered the defendants to pay Ms. Al-
dridge $7,000. Id. at 2. Enforcing the ruling, the Federal Court discussed both
Australian law and the International Convention on Elimination of all Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women:
Section 28 of the [Sex Discrimination Act of 1984] is a valid exercise of
the external affairs power... if it gives effect to an international con-
vention which Australia has adopted, in this case, [the International]
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Wo-
men .... It is sufficient to give effect to a convention if an Act gives
effect to principles stated in the convention; it is not necessary that the
legislation implement an obligation imposed on Australia by adoption
of the convention. Section 28 ... [gave] effect to the Convention... in
the sense that it implemented an obligation imposed on Australia by
Article 11.1 of the Convention to take appropriate measures to elimi-
nate discrimination against women in the field of employment in order
to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights.
Id. at 2. In initially construing Section 28 of the Sex Discrimination Act, the Federal
Court of Australia took notice of overseas judicial opinion. "A finding that [the Sex
Discrimination Act] does not include sexual harassment of the kind to which [Sec-
tion] 28 is directed would appear contrary to the trend of judicial opinion in Austra-
lia and overseas." Hall V. A & A Sheiban PTY Ltd., 85 A.L.R. 503, 504 (Fed. Ct.
1989).
288. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 122-46.
289. Id.
290. C. TRAv. art. L. 122-46. Translated by Beverley Earle, In French,
Aucun salari6 ne pent 8tre sanctionne ni licenci6 pour avoir subi ou
refuse de subir les agissements de harcalement d'un employer, de son
repr~sentant ou de toute personne qui abusant de l'autorith qui lui con-
firent ses fonctions a donne des ordres, protbre des menaces, impose
des contraintes ou exerce des pressions de toute nature sur ce salari6
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Though this law reflects substantial progress, it is limited in that it
focuses on blackmail-type actions rather than the creation of a hos-
tile environment. 291 Some French citizens, concerned that France
would wholeheartedly adopt an American view, greeted this limited
definition of harassment with relief.292 A columnist in L'Express
expressed sympathy for quid pro quo claims but lamented a world
where a man becomes fearful of complimenting a woman and so
refrains. 293 While mere "compliments" do not rise to the level of
compensable harm under either French or U.S. law, comments con-
taining graphic bodily detail might constitute actionable sexual
harassment in the United States but not in France.294
Currently, a paucity of cases interpret France's new laws so
their legal ramifications may not be clear for some time. The
French approach of criminalizing harassment would not be effective
in the United States. Although a judgment might force employers
and individuals to take sexual harassment seriously, such an ap-
proach would not achieve the objective of compensating the victim.
Furthermore, the higher burden of proof in criminal cases might
dissuade victims from pressing a complaint, particularly where am-
biguity exists or where there were no verifiable threats. The issue
of when behavior crosses the boundary from acceptable banter to
actionable sexual harassment has yet to be clarified in either the
U.S. or France.
dans le but d'obtenir des faveurs de nature sexuelle A son profit ou au
profit d'un tiers. Aucun salarie ne peut 6tre sanctionne ni licencid pour
avoir tbmoigne des agissements dAfinis a 'alinba prbcedent ou pour les
avoir relates.
291. See generally Philip Jacobson, France Prepares to Outlaw the Unwanted Of-
fice Flirt, THE Tn Es (LoNvoN), Jan. 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
TTIMES File (discussing feminist criticism of limited application of the penal code);
France Has New Law Banning Sexual Harassment, Agence France Presse, Oct. 19,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File (asserting that the Communists
abstained from voting on the labor code because it was a "watered down version").
292. See supra notes 271-283 and accompanying text.
293. Andre Pautard, Harceler disent-elles, L'ExPREss, Nov. 22, 1991, at 5 (describ-
ing differences between America and France). "[L]a courtoisie galante ne de
'admiration irrdpressible de tout mfle pour les reprdsentantes du sexe oppose qui
mdritent un hommage .... " Id.
294. See generally Riding, supra note 1 (contrasting the French legal approach
which criminalizes coercive demands for sexual favors while avoiding legislation
that would impair flirting behavior or compliments, with the U.S. law which many
Europeans view as outlawing harmless flattery); Policy Guidance, supra note 78, at
6691-92 (discussing the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's position
that verbal conduct may constitute sexual harassment).
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B. United Kingdom
There is no specific mention of sexual harassment in the law of
the United Kingdom.295 However, in 1986, the court in Porcelli v.
Strathclyde Regional Council interpreted the 1975 Sex Discrimina-
tion Act296 to include sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimi-
nation.297 This decision was contemporaneous with Vinson, where
the U.S. Supreme Court recognized sexual harassment as a form of
discrimination. 298
Ms. Porcelli was hired as a laboratory technician.299 The
court concluded that Porcelli was sexually harassed by two other
male laboratory technicians, based on a finding that she suffered
unfavorable treatment at her job because she was a woman.3 00 The
defendants did not challenge the court's conclusion of harassment,
but instead argued that they treated Porcelli no less favorably than
a man.301 They argued that they would have harassed a male tech-
nician as well had they disliked him, but using different words and
actions.30 2 In rejecting the defendants' argument, the court de-
scribed harassment as a "sexual sword" that was "unsheathed" and
used because Porcelli was a woman.30 3 According to the court, if
that sword inflicts more than a scratch, then it was "unsheathed
because the victim was a woman," and therefore violates the Sex
Discrimination Act.30 4 The Court stated:
In my opinion these offensive remarks were examples of the use
by Messrs. Coles and Reid of a 'sexual sword', and were of a
sufficiently material nature to be to the applicant's detriment
.... [Wihile the treatment accorded to the woman may be less
cruel than that accorded to the man, [a hypothetical man] it
may still have been meted out to her on the ground of her sex,
and therefore be 'less favorable' in terms of section 1(1)(a) [of
the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975].305
Criticizing both the lower court and the Employment Appeals Tri-
bunal which ruled against Porcelli, Lord Brand succinctly stated:
"they should have asked (1) was there sexual harassment and (2) if
295. DIGEST, supra note 8, at 156.
296. Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65, 2 Pus. GEN. AcTS AND MEASUREs, 1975,
amended by ch. 59, 1986, 3 PuB. GEN. AcTs AND MEASURES.
297. Porcelli v. Strathclyde Regional Council, 1986 I.C.R. 564 (Scot. Sess.).
298. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 62 (1986).
299. Porcelli, 1986 I.C.R. at 565.
300. Id. at 568.
301. Id. at 569.
302. Id. at 569-70.
303. Id. at 573.
304. Porcelli, 1986 I.C.R. at 573.
305. Id. at 574. For additional discussion see Nicole R. Lipper, Comment, Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace: A Comparative Study of Great Britain and the United
States, 13 Comp. LAB. L.J. 293, 317 (1992).
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so was it to the detriment of the applicant .... It follows that if a
form of unfavourable treatment is meted out to a woman to which a
man would not be vulnerable, she has been discriminated against
within the meaning of section 1(1)(a)."30 6 Porcelli was significant
because the court acknowledged sexual harassment as an actiona-
ble claim. Moreover, the court neither considered the issue of "wel-
comeness" nor scrutinized Ms. Porcelli's behavior.
The explosion of sexual harassment claims is not unique to the
United States. The Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) in
Britain released a report finding that harassment complaints in-
creased 50%, employment complaints increased 40%, and pay in-
quiries increased 20% in 1991.307 Despite these increases, a
London School of Economics and Political Science study reported
that a large percentage of harassment incidents went unreported in
Britain.308 The reported reasons, not surprisingly, were concerns
that the incidents would not be taken seriously, and because of the
seniority of the harassers.30 9 Other victims might not complain be-
cause very few complainants achieve compensation of any kind due
to difficulties in proving their cases and in financing legal costs. 3 10
EOC chair, Ms. Joanna Foster commented:
[W]hile expectations of fair treatment are higher than ever
before redress is more difficult to obtain because of the complex-
ity and the cost of taking legal action. If the Government is
serious about its Citizens' Charter giving individuals greater
understanding of their rights and access to the means of re-
dress, then it will now need to give serious consideration to the
amendments we have put forward to simplify and strengthen
the equality laws. A simple start could be made by revising and
simplifying Tribunal and Court procedures to remove barriers
causing delays (the average length of time taken for a case to
reach employment appeals tribunals is two years in England
and Wales); recruiting more women members to the Industrial
Tribunals and the EAT; and establishing a substantial basic
306. Porcelli, 1986 I.C.R. at 576.
307. Allan Jones, Campaign to Fight Sexual Harassment, Press Assoc. Newsfile,
Mar. 5, 1992 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PANEWS File; Britain Issues Har-
assment Code, WAL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1992, at A6 (noting that the Government re-
ceived 427 sexual harassment complaints in 1991, "up 50% from 1990); UK Institute
of Personnel Management Reports that Harassment Still Goes Largely Unpunished,
supra note 263.
308. See Thompson, supra note 207, at 13.
309. Id.
310. Michael Smith, Woman Wins 6,000 Pounds (sterling) Harassment Award,
FiN. TIMEs (LoNDON), Apr. 3, 1989, at 10. (discussing a case where a baker resigned
after three months of fending off supervisor's kisses).
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minimum award for successful discrimination cases with com-
pensatory awards extra.
3 1 1
In 1991, more than 90% of British companies had no policy on sex-
ual harassment.3 12
Despite this dismal picture, numerous recent cases report
modest victories for complainants. For example, an industrial tri-
bunal awarded a woman who was called a "tart" and a "slapper" one
thousand pounds sterling.3 13 The court rejected the defense that
both men and women were verbally abused in the office. 3 14 With
respect to the abusive comments, the chairman of the tribunal
stated, "[t]hey were unpleasant, they caused hurt and distress and
undermined confidence. They were not in any way trivial .... We
make the wider point that no one should have to put up with such
treatment at her workplace - or anywhere else."3 15
The United Kingdom opted for a voluntary approach encour-
aging companies to enact policies on sexual harassment.3 16 This
decision was inspired partially by the EC Code of Practice encour-
aging member states' action.3 17 The decision is also consistent with
the United Kingdom's aversion to social legislation proposed by the
EC.3 18 The United Kingdom strongly prefers industrial flexibility
and is reluctant to model itself after France or Germany, especially
with regard to worker's rights and participation in management.
3 19
The United Kingdom offers no promising model for addressing sex-
ual harassment in a more effective way.
311. UK: EOC - 40% Increase in Workplace Discrimination Complaints Exerts
Pressure for Law Reform, Reuters Textline, June 24, 1992, available in LEXIS,
World Library, ALLNWS File.
312. Facts on File, WORLD Naws DIGEST, Jan. 30, 1992, at 61 (basing this finding
on a Manchester Institute of Technology survey). The survey also reported that "the
most common outcome of sexual harassment complaints in Britain was an official or
unofficial warning to the alleged harasser. The second most common outcome was
no action." Id.
313. £1,000 Award to Woman Over 'Tart' Taunts, Press Assoc. Newsfile, Sept. 10,
1992 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PANEWS File.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. See Alison Roberts & Richard Ford, Tough line urged on office sex pests, THE
Tudss (LONDON), Mar. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, TI1vIES File.
The British Government issued a pamphlet consistent with the European Code of
Practice and mailed it to 100,000 companies. Id. See also Jones, supra note 307
(discussing mailing the pamphlet).
317. See supra notes 256-262 and accompanying text.
318. See COLCHESTER & BUCnAN, supra note 243, at 184-86 (discussing social pol-
icy and disagreement among the member states); A Rude Awakening, supra note
251 at 8 (discussing the role of the UK in the EC).
319. See COLCHESTER & BucIAn, supra note 243, at 188 (discussing co-determina-




Other countries address sexual harassment through a number
of approaches with varying degrees of success. These approaches
include anti-discrimination laws, labor laws, tort law and criminal
laws. 320 Before examining these in more detail, the European con-
text with regard to workers should be examined. European work-
ers are afforded significant workplace protections. These
protections include maternity leave, severance pay, dismissals re-
quiring just cause, more vacation and worker representation on
boards.321 These protections are in marked contrast to the employ-
ment at will status of most workers in the United States.3 22 Thus,
there may be less "urgency" for increased worker protection in Eu-
rope than in the U.S.
European countries, and countries around the world have re-
cently implemented or revised sexual harassment legislation. A
survey of other countries shows whether the country has specific
sexual harassment legislation.
320. See DIGEST, supra note 8, at 67-173.
321. See Schaffer et al., supra note 243, at 448-49 (discussing impediments to dis-
missal); see generally FOLSOM, supra note 243, at 185 (discussing social policy in the
European Community including a discussion of Spain); see Alan Riding, Women to
the Fore! (What would Franco Say?) N.Y. TIEs, May 30, 1989, at A4 (noting that
Spain provides paid paternity leave four weeks and paid maternity leave 16 weeks as
well as the right for either parent to take an unpaid year off to care for the baby).
322. For discussion of the employment at will doctrine see Aleta Sangrey Calla-
han, Employment at Will: The Relationship between Societal Expectations and the
Law, 28 A.B.L.J. 455 (1990)
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Belgium Yes (recently reported to
have changed)3 23
Canada Yes












Luxembourg No (1 court case)
Netherlands Yes (1992)
New Zealand Yes




Switzerland No (but case law)
UK No (but case law)
US Yes (and case law)3 2 4
Even countries that do not have specific statutes pertaining to sex-
ual harassment may use discrimination laws as a basis for sexual
harassment claims. The EC Code of Practice explicitly recognizes
this avenue of redress. 3 26
In Japan "seku hara," or sexual harassment, is actionable
under § 709 of the Japanese Civil Code which states "a person who
intentionally or negligently violates the right of another is bound to
make compensation for damages arising therefrom."32 6 In one Jap-
323. See Sex Harassment at Work Grows as Global Concern, supra note 211, at A5
(noting that Belgium reportedly enacted specific sexual harassment legislation).
324. DIGEST, supra note 8, at 67-173.
325. 1992 OJ (L 49) 3, reprinted in DIGEST, supra note 8, at 33. The Code of Prac-
tice states:
The Law and Employers' Responsibilities. Conduct of a sexual nature or
other conduct based on sex affecting the dignity of women and men at
work may be contrary to the principle of equal treatment within the
meaning of Article 3, 4 and 5 of Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 Feb-
ruary 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment
for men and women ....
Id.
326. DIGEST, supra note 8, at 118 (quoting Civil Code, Law No. 89 of 1896
(Kampoo, 1986), as amended up to Act No. 68 of 1979 (Kampoo, 1979)).
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anese case, an unmarried woman brought an action against her su-
pervisor who suggested she was promiscuous.3 27 Initially, the
claimant took her case to arbitrators who advised her to be "flat-
tered" by the attention.3 28 Ultimately, the court ordered the de-
fendant to pay her the equivalent of $12,500 U.S. dollars, though
this was less than the claimant originally sought.32 9
For many countries sexual harassment in the workplace has
yet to be addressed - perhaps because concerns for basic survival
are paramount. In Poland, for example, classified ads commonly
list good looks as a necessary job requirement.330 In a 1990 survey,
the Warsaw Voice reported that "Polish women do not debate the
phenomenon described as sexual harassment in the West. Do they
view it as a problem? Even if they do, it is certainly not a major
problem in their minds."33
Other cities and countries are moving ahead to combat sexual
harassment. In Germany, Stuttgart mayor Manfred Rommel, son
of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, is reportedly leading efforts to
eliminate sexual harassment in his country.33 2 He seeks to ban
pinups in offices, flirting, 'fondling' and 'lascivious glances' in Ger-
man offices.333 Many countries are moving towards either explicit
recognition of sexual harassment or classifying harassment as a
form of discrimination.3 34 However, in many places the concept of
sexual harassment is disregarded or mocked33 despite survey data
documenting its pervasiveness.336 Clearly, no country has found a
way to entirely eliminate sexual harassment despite both legal
changes and education.
Conclusion
The development of sexual harassment law in the United
States clearly exerts an important influence upon the world in the
327. Weisman, supra note 215.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Dorota J. Bartyzel, Women's Rights: Gals, Ladies and Feminists, WARSAW
VOICE, Mar. 8, 1992, at 12.
331. Id.
332. Joseph Fleming, Rommel's Son Campaigns Against German Sexism, WASH.
Tnmrs, Dec. 6, 1990, at A7 (also noting that a backlash against the feminist cause
includes the publication of a handbook for 'the new German male chauvinist").
333. Id.
334. See supra text accompanying note 324.
335. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 333 (discussing an anti-feminist backlash in
Germany); Zingg, supra note 11 (quoting a Japanese lawyer as stating, "[M]ost Japa-
nese do not think sexual harassment violates human rights .... They think it's a
trivial thing.").
336. See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text.
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effort to remedy sex discrimination. Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 laid the groundwork for legislation of similar types
around the world.3 37 Sexual harassment laws are converging at an
international level, though convergence does not mean the ap-
proaches of various countries are identical.
Unfortunately, despite the recent Harris decision, the United
States has abdicated its role as leader in this area of equal treat-
ment and providing remedies for sexual harassment. To reassert
leadership in this area, three legislative changes are necessary.
First, the legislature should repeal the section of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 that imposed caps on recovery for victims of sexual har-
assment.3 3 8 The recent imposition of caps on recovery under the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 sends a clear message that this type of dis-
crimination should be treated less seriously than racial discrimina-
tion. Placing limitations on monetary recovery for only certain
types of actions appears to be a legislative bone thrown to appease
corporate defendants who are often the "deep pockets" in sexual
harassment actions.3 39
Second, America's definition of sexual harassment should be
statutorily amended to delete the "welcomeness" test. This amend-
ment would end debate over whether to apply a reasonable woman
or a reasonable person standard and would shift the inquiry away
from a plaintiffs conduct and demeanor. Employers would have an
obligation to maintain a workplace free of sexual harassment. This
does not mean that employers should become "speech police" or
watchdogs of sexual correctness, instead, employers should make
an effort to educate their employees about harassment. For exam-
ple, the U.S. Navy recently published a short, but detailed, code on
sexual harassment in the wake of the "Tailhook" incident.340 It
listed behaviors under the headings of "green light," "yellow light"
and "red light" to help differentiate acceptable and unacceptable
behaviors.341
337. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text discussing the imposition of
caps on recovery under Title VII.
339. The list of corporate defendants who have been sued for sexual harassment
in the federal courts includes many major U.S. companies. See, e.g., Scott v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986); Spencer v. General Electric Co., 894
F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1990); Hew-Len v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 737 F. Supp. 1104 (D.
Haw. 1990).
340. See Maureen Dowd, Navy Defines Sexual Harassment with Colors of Traffic
Lights, N.Y. Thms, June 19, 1993, § 1, at 1 (describing the code created by the Navy
in response to the Tailhook incident).
341. Id. (noting that "green zone" includes saying "hello", yellow zone includes
questions about personal life and "unwanted poems," and red zone includes rape).
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Essentially, a harassment-free workplace is analogous to
clean air and a safe environment - employees need them in order
to work efficiently. A Massachusetts law provides an example of a
move towards establishing a right to a harassment free environ-
ment.3 42 The law states: "A person shall have the right to be free
from sexual harassment .... The superior court shall have the ju-
risdiction in equity to enforce this right and to award damages."
3 43
Courts should also consider the different perceptions of men
and women toward harassment which are documented in many
studies.3 44 Thus, courts should apply the reasonably prudent wo-
man standard to analyze when actions or words cross the line from
isolated acts of sexism to violations Title VII. A "harassment free
workplace" standard would simplify an inquiry. The analysis
would focus on whether offensive words or conduct occurred.3 45 If
so, then damages would be assessed based on the severity of the
harasser's conduct. The Harris decision, rejecting the requirement
of psychological harm to establish a claim under Title VII, is a step
in the right direction.3 4 6
Significant leadership from the United States on the issue sex-
ual harassment would be enormously helpful at the international
level. United States ratification of the UN Convention on the Elim-
ination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women would be an
important symbolic step.3 4 7 Some countries maintain that enforce-
ment of women's rights in accord with the Convention would inter-
fere with states autonomy and sovereignty as well as religious
freedom. 348 Consequently, intolerable and universally condemned
practices against any racial minority, are tolerated and excused
when practiced against women.3 4 9
342. MASs. GEN. L. ch. 214, § 1C (1986).
343. Id.
344. For a review of numerous studies collected by country, see DIGEST, supra
note 8, at 67-173.
345. Professor Estrich advocates a standard requiring harassment free
workplaces:
if an objective standard is to be applied at all, then it should be defined
by reference to a normative standard of a nonhostile workplace, not to a
standard of what powerless and economically dependent women are
willing to tolerate. Credibility rules should be reformulated to elimi-
nate the double standard and sharply limit, if not entirely eliminate,
the persuasive value of the absence of corroboration or a fresh
complaint.
Estrich, Sex at Work, supra note 21, at 858.
346. See supra notes 132-187 and accompanying text discussing proof of psycho-
logical harm in U.S. sexual harassment cases.
347. See supra text accompanying note 223.
348. See supra notes 223-232 and accompanying text.
349. See supra text accompanying notes 225-226.
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Legal developments in the United States regarding sexual
harassment are a catalyst for change around the globe. The United
States, through Congress and the courts, must alter its interpreta-
tion of Title VII to focus on the actions of harassers and to better
protect victims of sexual harassment. In the words of one court:
We realize that it is unrealistic to hold an employer accountable
for every isolated incident of sexism, however, we do not con-
sider it an unfair burden of an employer of both genders to take
measures to prevent an atmosphere of sexism to pervade the
workplace. 350
Only this approach will secure a harassment-free environment for
all employees. If the pattern of looking toward the United States
for leadership in the area of sexual harassment continues, it will
only be a short time before a new, less ambivalent definition will be
exported around the world.
350. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d. 1469, 1486 (3rd Cir. 1990) (dis-
cussing the problem of sexual harassment in a police station).
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